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Summary
In this thesis, I study the macroeconomic link between government policies
and entrepreneurship. In the first chapter, I look at the informal economy
in high-income countries and show that taxes and the quality of governance
can account for a large fraction of cross country differences in informality. In
the second chapter, I ask why the East German economy, in contrast to other
transition economies, suffers from a lack of entrepreneurial activity and low
growth rates. In particular, I study how the integration of East Germany into
an established economy - West Germany - adversely affected the allocation of
entrepreneurial talent in East Germany.
The first chapter entitled “Tax Rates, Governance, and the Informal Economy
in High -Income Countries” studies the mechanisms behind the informal econ-
omy in high-income countries. About 16.7% of output in high-income OECD
countries was produced informally in 2001-02 (Schneider (2002)). Davis and
Henrekson (2004) show that there exists a positive relation between tax rates
and the informal economy for high-income OECD countries. While existing
models of the informal economy mostly focus on developing countries where
informality is linked to the use of labor-intensive and low productive tech-
nologies, this chapter studies the mechanisms behind the informal economy in
high-income countries.
I build a model economy, following Lucas (1978), in which agents of different
managerial abilities decide to become workers, managers of informal firms, or
managers of formal firms. Managers of informal firms use the same technol-
ogy as formal managers. However, in contrast to formal managers, managers
of informal firms do not pay taxes but run the risk of getting caught, taxed,
and fined. Simulations show that differences in tax rates can only account
for approximately 33% of the observed variation in informal economy across
vii
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high-income countries. The quality of governance, the extent to which these
tax rates are enforced, however, plays a more significant role. Differences in
governance quality can account for about 43% of the variation. When com-
bining differences in tax rates with differences in governance quality, the mod-
el accounts for approximately 56% of the cross-country variation in informal
economy. Policy experiments show that if all countries attained Switzerland’s
governance quality, average informality would drop by around 15%. I estimate
average costs of this policy to be equivalent to at most 26% of the average tax
administration’s budget and find gains in tax revenues to be around ten times
larger than these costs.
This chapter contributes to the small literature on the informal economy in
high-income countries by being the first one, to the best of my knowledge, in
quantifying explicitly the separate and joint effects of two important driving
forces on the informal economy, tax rates and the quality of governance.
The second chapter entitled “Migration, Wages, and Parental Background:
Obstacles to Entrepreneurship and Growth in East Germany” addresses the
question of how East Germany’s integration into an established economy, West
Germany, may have hindered a fruitful development of entrepreneurship and
how this may have affected economic growth. For the last decade, the East
German economy has been suffering from high unemployment and low eco-
nomic growth. Policy makers often point to the lack of entrepreneurship as
one of East Germany’s main problems.
I build a model economy that places Lucas (1978)’ span-of-control model into
an overlapping-generations framework. Following Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora
(2000) managerial knowhow is defined as a combination of two factors, innate
talent and entrepreneurial parental background, and growth depends on the in-
nate talent of entrepreneurs only. In East Germany, the lack of entrepreneurial
viii
parental background makes innate talent the decisive factor in occupational
choice and more talented entrepreneurs should contribute to high growth rates.
However, three key aspects of East Germany’s integration into West Germany
inhibit this mechanism: 1) the unrestricted mobility of East Germans to the
West, 2) the policy of fixing East German wages as fractions of West German
wages, and 3) the importance of parental background for entrepreneurship in
West Germany. I first calibrate the basic model economy to West Germany
before reunification pinning down the key parameters governing the role of
parental background and the link between entrepreneurship and growth. The
model is then extended to account for aspects of reunification allowing for mi-
gration between West and East Germany. I run counterfactual experiments
eliminating any of the three key aspects of integration - Migration, Wages,
and Parental Background - and find that they all pose obstacles to more en-
trepreneurs, less unemployment, and higher economic growth in East Germany.
This chapter contributes to the literature by being the first one, to the best of
my knowledge, that explicitly models the link between a lack of entrepreneur-
ship and low economic growth in East Germany. It applies the theory estab-
lished by the literature on social mobility and economic growth to the context
of economic transition. From the historical unique context of a generation
without parental background in entrepreneurship arises the natural question
of its implications for economic growth. This chapter tries to address this
question and to provide some quantification of the implications for the case of
East Germany.
ix
Two Essays on the Macroeconomic Analysis of Government
Policies and Entrepreneurship
Resumen
En esta tesis analizo los mecanismos que relacionan las pol´ıticas pu´blicas con
la creacio´n de empresas por parte de emprendedores. En el primer cap´ıtulo
estudio la economı´a informal en pa´ıses desarrollados y demuestro que la carga
impositiva y la calidad de la gestio´n pu´blica pueden explicar una parte consid-
erable de la variacio´n en las tasas de informalidad entre pa´ıses. En el segundo
cap´ıtulo investigo las razones por las que la economı´a de Alemania del Este, a
diferencia de otros pa´ıses en transicio´n, sufre de falta de emprendedores y bajas
tasas de crecimiento econo´mico. En concreto, muestro como la integracio´n de
Alemania del Este con una economı´a madura- Alemania Occidental- ha podido
afectar de manera adversa la asignacio´n de talento empresarial en Alemania
del Este.
El primer cap´ıtulo llamado “Tasas impositivas, Gestio´n de Gobierno, y la
Economı´a Informal en Pa´ıses de Renta Alta” estudia los mecanismos detra´s
de la economı´a informal en pa´ıses de renta alta. Alrededor del 16.7% de la
produccio´n de los pa´ıses de renta alta de la OCDE se realizo´ de manera infor-
mal durante los an˜os 2001 y 2002 (Schneider (2002)). Davis and Henrekson
(2004) establecen una relacio´n positiva entre tases impositivas y el taman˜o de
la economı´a informal para los pa´ıses de renta alta. Los modelos cla´sicos de
economı´a informal suelen estar enfocados a pa´ıses en v´ıas de desarrollo donde
la informalidad esta´ vinculada al uso de tecnolog´ıas de baja productividad e
intensivas en el uso del factor trabajo mientras que este cap´ıtulo estudia los
mecanismos detra´s de la economı´a informal en pa´ıses de renta alta.
Para analizar este problema, planteo un modelo similar al de Lucas (1978) en el
cual agentes con distintas habilidades para dirigir empresas deciden ser traba-
x
jadores, emprendedores formales o emprendedores informales. Los emprende-
dores informales usan la misma tecnolog´ıa que los emprendedores formales.
Sin embargo, a diferencia de los emprendedores formales, los emprendedores
informales no pagan impuestos sino que corren el riesgo de ser descubiertos y
tener que pagar los impuestos ma´s una multa. Las simulaciones del modelo
demuestran que diferencias en las tasas impositivas pueden explicar aproxi-
madamente un 33% de la variacio´n observada en la tasa de economı´a informal
entre pa´ıses de renta alta. Por otro lado, la calidad de gestio´n del gobierno –
definida como el nivel con el que se hacen cumplir las obligaciones tributarias
– desempen˜a un rol ma´s importante. En concreto, diferencias en la calidad
de gestio´n de gobierno pueden explicar el 43% de la variacio´n. Finalmente,
un modelo con ambas caracter´ısticas (diferencias en las tasas impositivas y en
la gestio´n pu´blica) puede explicar aproximadamente el 56% de la variacio´n en
las tasas de informalidad entre pa´ıses. A la luz de estos resultados, realizo ex-
perimentos que muestran que si todos los pa´ıses tuviesen la calidad de gestio´n
de gobierno de Suiza, la informalidad se reducir´ıa, en media, en un 15%. Los
costes de gestionar tal medida equivaldr´ıan a un 26% del presupuesto medio
de Hacienda, mientras que las ganancias en te´rminos de recaudacio´n adicional
de impuestos ser´ıan diez veces ma´s altas que estos costes.
Este cap´ıtulo contribuye a la reducida literatura sobre economı´a informal en
pa´ıses desarrollados, siendo el primer art´ıculo del que tengo constancia que
cuantifica la influencia individual y conjunta de dos factores determinantes de
la economı´a informal: las tasas impositivas y la calida de gestio´n de gobierno.
En el segundo cap´ıtulo llamado “Migracio´n, salarios, y antecedentes familiares:
obsta´culos a los emprendedores y al crecimiento en Alemania del Este” me pre-
gunto co´mo la integracio´n de Alemania del Este con una economı´a madura,
Alemania Occidental, puede haber inhibido un desarrollo fruct´ıfero del esp´ıritu
emprendedor y co´mo esto puede haber ralentizado su crecimiento econo´mico.
Alemania Oriental esta´ sufriendo tasas de desempleo altas y tasas de crecimien-
xi
Two Essays on the Macroeconomic Analysis of Government
Policies and Entrepreneurship
to econo´mico bajas desde hace ma´s de una de´cada y varios actores pol´ıticos
han hecho hincapie´ en la falta de esp´ıritu emprendedor en Alemania del Este
como una de sus principales causas.
Para responder a esta pregunta construyo un modelo a` la Lucas (1978) en un
contexto de generaciones superpuestas. Siguiendo Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora
(2000), el nivel de conocimiento de los emprendedores esta´ compuesto de dos
factores: talento innato y antecedentes familiares de emprendedores. El crec-
imiento econo´mico en este modelo depende solamente del talento innato de los
emprendedores. En Alemania del Este, la falta de antecedentes familiares de
emprendedores implica que el talento innato es el factor decisivo en la decisio´n
de la ocupacio´n y ma´s emprendedores talentosos deber´ıan contribuir a tasas
de crecimiento altas. Sin embargo hay tres aspectos clave de la integracio´n con
Alemania Occidental que inhiben este mecanismo: 1) La movilidad sin restric-
ciones de alemanes del Este hacia del Oeste; 2) La pol´ıtica de fijar los salarios
en Alemania del Este como fraccio´n de los salarios en Alemania Occidental;
3) La importancia de antecedentes familiares en la decisio´n de convertirse en
emprendedor en Alemania Occidental. Comienzo el ana´lisis con la calibracio´n
del modelo ba´sico para que represente a la economı´a de Alemania Occidental
antes de la reunificacio´n, fijando as´ı los para´metros clave que determinan el
rol de los antecedentes familiares y el v´ınculo entre el talento de los emprende-
dores y el crecimiento. En un segundo paso, ampl´ıo el modelo para incorporar
aspectos de la reunificacio´n, permitiendo la migracio´n entre las dos Alemanias.
Finalmente, y a fin de cuantificar cua´les son los mecanismos ma´s importantes,
elimino secuencialmente cada uno de los tres aspectos sen˜alados: migracio´n,
salarios, y antecedentes familiares. Los resultados muestran que todos suponen
obsta´culos para que aparezcan ma´s emprendedores, se reduzca el desempleo y
se incremente el crecimiento en Alemania del Este.
Este cap´ıtulo contribuye a la literatura siendo el primero, del que tengo conocimien-
to, que expl´ıcitamente modela el v´ınculo entre la falta de emprendedores y
xii
bajas tasas de crecimiento en Alemania Oriental. Aplica la teor´ıa establecida
de la literatura de movilidad social y crecimiento econo´mico al contexto de la
transicio´n econo´mica. Alemania del Este ofrece una perspectiva histo´rica u´nica
para estudiar el impacto del talento empresarial en el crecimiento econo´mico
al estar formada por trabajadores que carecen de emprendedores entre sus an-
tecedentes familiares ma´s pro´ximos. Este cap´ıtulo trata de dar una respuesta
a esta cuestio´n desde un punto de vista cuantitativo.
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Chapter 1
Tax Rates, Governance, and the
Informal Economy in
High-Income Countries
1.1 Introduction
Informal economic activity was long thought to be a feature of developing
countries. Formalization of business was supposed to go hand in hand with
economic development. But despite worldwide economic growth, employment
has increasingly become informal as stated by the United Nations (2006). In-
deed, even among high-income countries a large part of economic activity is
informal. Schneider (2002) defines the informal economy as all “unreported
income from the production of legal goods and services [...] which would gen-
erally be taxable were they reported to the [...] authorities.”(p.4).
Schneider (2002)’s estimates of the informal economy, reproduced in Fig-
ure 1.1.1, show that on average 16.7% of GDP in high-income OECD countries
5
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Figure 1.1.1: Informal Economy 2001-02 as % of official GDP
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was produced informally in 2001-02.1 In Greece the informal economy amount-
ed to 28.5% of GDP, whereas in the US an equivalent of 8.7% of GDP was
estimated to have been produced informally.2 Put differently, the production
of goods and services worth $892 billion (about $3,090 per capita) went un-
taxed in the US, while in Greece production of goods and services worth $49
billion (about $4,380 per capita) escaped taxation.3
Given that there are sizable differences in the informal economy, even across
1In this chapter ’OECD’ or ’high-income OECD countries’ excludes the following OECD
countries whose GDP per capita in 2001-02 was lower than Greece’s or whose population
amounted to less than 1 million inhabitants: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Turkey.
2Frey and Weck (1983) cite various alternative estimates for informality. More recent
estimates are hard to come by. One exception is Alan˜o´n Pardo and Go´mez de Antonio
(2004) for Spain. According to them, the Spanish informal economy amounts to 20.9% of
GDP (2000), compared to 22.5% (2001-02) estimated by Schneider (2002).
3Schneider (2002) estimates the informal economy either by the currency demand ap-
proach that attributes any changes in ’excess’ demand in currency to increases in informali-
ty or by the so-called DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes) model that
incorporates multiple causes of informality into the estimation (see Appendix A.1.1 for a
discussion on methods of estimating the informal economy).
6
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high-income countries, the following two questions arise: What are the driving
forces behind informal economic activity in high-income countries? To what
extent can differences in these driving forces account for cross-country differ-
ences in the informal economy?
Figure 1.1.2: Tax Rates and the Informal Economy 95-96
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A recent paper by Davis and Henrekson (2004) provides one possible answer
to the first question. Across 16 high-income OECD countries the authors find
a positive and significant relation between tax rates and the informal economy.
Figure 1.1.2, which relates tax rates on income and consumption and social se-
curity contributions to the size of the informal economy, is a replication of their
result. Despite a positive relation between tax rates and the informal econo-
my, for countries with equally high tax rates, informal economy estimates are
strikingly different. In 1995-96, Austria and Italy had similar total tax rates
on income and consumption and social security contributions of around 70%
and 75%. But whereas Austria’s informal economy was estimated to amount
to 8.6% of GDP, the estimate for Italy was 26%. On the other hand, Austria
and Switzerland were estimated to have a similar sized informal economy but
7
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differed strikingly in their total tax rates on income and consumption. Apart
from tax rates additional forces seem to drive the informal economy in high-
income countries.
Lack of institutional quality and corruption are possible suspects. Their
importance for explaining differences in informal economy has been illustrated
by various empirical studies. Friedman et al. (2000), Chong and Gradstein
(2007), and Johnson et al. (1998) all find a positive relation between lack of
institutional quality, a large regulatory burden, corruption and the informal
economy. The link between institutional quality and the informal economy also
holds for high-income countries. The Global Competitiveness Survey carried
out by the World Economic Forum (2003) provides a measure of institutional
quality. It asks business executives for their opinions on various aspects of the
country they operate in, among others on government and institutions and in
particular about the competence of public sector personnel, quality of general
infrastructure, and time spent by senior management dealing with government
officials. I use a ranking of countries based on answers to these particular as-
pects of the Global Competitiveness Survey (GCI-Governance) as a measure
of institutional quality.4 Figure 1.1.3 displays the negative relation across 21
high-income OECD countries between the GCI-Governance Index and esti-
mates of the informal economy.5
4The same part of the Global Competitiveness Survey referring to aspects of institu-
tional quality is used by the World Bank to construct its Government Effectiveness Index
(Kaufmann et al. (2006)). Throughout the chapter, I will refer to it as the GCI-Governance
Index.
5The negative relationship is robust to various alternative measures of institutional qual-
ity by the World Bank as the Control of Corruption Index, the Regulatory Quality Index
or the Rule of Law Index (Kaufmann et al. (2006)) as well as Transparency International
(2002)’s anti-corruption index. The negative relationship is also robust to the exclusion of
Greece and Portugal, the two poorest among the 21 high-income OECD countries. Percent-
ages of affirmative answers to “if cheating on taxes is justified” and “if almost all compatriots
cheat on taxes”(World Value Survey (2000)), are clearly positively related to estimates of
the informal economy.
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Figure 1.1.3: GCI-Governance and the Informal Economy
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In contrast to the current chapter, the existing literature on the informal
economy has almost exclusively looked at developing countries. Most models
propose mechanisms that link informality to labor-intensive economic activi-
ties of low productivity. An informal firm in these models is defined up front
as less productive and it faces higher input prices, mainly for capital. This
chapter on the other hand tries to account for the informal economy in high-
income countries and characterizes an informal firm as a common firm that
evades taxes and faces a risk of getting caught. It stresses the positive link
between tax rates and informality that can only be broken by high quality
institutions.
The current chapter proposes a model that relates differences in the size
of the informal economy and tax evasion to differences in tax rates and in-
stitutional quality. Institutional quality determines the extent to which tax
rates are enforced. In the model economy, there is a representative household
and a government. The household has a continuum of members who differ in
their managerial ability, as in Lucas (1978). Given their abilities, household
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members can become workers, set up an informal firm and evade taxes, or set
up a formal firm and pay taxes. Firms producing informally face a probabil-
ity of getting caught, taxed, and fined. Formal and informal managers have
access to the same technology that uses labor, capital, and their managerial
ability as inputs. Occupational choices in this economy are characterized by
two thresholds for managerial ability. The first threshold defines who becomes
a worker and who will be an informal manager. The second threshold divides
informal and formal managers. These two thresholds determine the size of the
informal economy, and they depend on tax rates and the probability that an
informal firm gets caught evading taxes.
A calibrated version of the model quantifies the influence of tax rates and
governance quality on informality. It shows that differences in tax rates alone
can only account for approximately 33% of the observed variation in informal
economy across high-income countries, while differences in governance quality,
the extent to which these tax rates are enforced, can account for about 43%
of the variation. When combining both, differences in tax rates and differ-
ences in governance quality, the model accounts for 56% of the variation in
informality across high-income countries. I run a policy experiment with all
countries attaining the best governance quality observed (Switzerland’s) and
show that in this case average informality drops by approximately 15%. Fur-
thermore, I estimate average costs of this policy to be equivalent to at most
26% of the average tax administration’s budget and find gains in tax revenues
to be around ten times larger than these costs. Even by conservative costs
estimates, countries gain both in terms of reduced informality and increased
tax revenues when adopting this policy.
Among recent models of the informal economy, the ones that are closely re-
lated to this chapter are Amaral and Quintin (2006), Antunes and Cavalcanti
(2006), Prado (2007), and Aruoba (2009).6 Amaral and Quintin (2006) try to
6Another important strand of literature looks at the effects of the informal economy on
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account for characteristics of the labor market in developing countries, where
despite free entry to the formal sector informal workers tend to be less educated
and are paid less than formal workers. In their model, the informal economy
arises from imperfections in the capital market due to a lack of commitment
to financial contracts. Antunes and Cavalcanti (2006) use a similar framework
where employment tax, entry costs into the formal sector, and access to cred-
it lead to a more capital-intensive production by formal firms. The authors
examine the separate and joint influence of regulation costs and enforcement
costs of financial contracts on the informal economy. Prado (2007) builds a
model of monopolistic competition where firms can decide to operate formally
by paying taxes and an entry cost, or to operate informally paying an enforce-
ment cost. The author quantifies the influence of government policy, consisting
of tax rates, entry costs to the formal sector, and levels of enforcements on
the informal economy by backing out unobserved levels of enforcement for all
OECD countries and Brazil. Recent work by Aruoba (2009) models informal
and formal markets in the spirit of day and night markets. The author relates
informality, inflation, taxes, measured output, and governance in a framework
where tax policy and inflation rates are being set endogenously by a benev-
olent planner. I view his results as complementary to mine as they highlight
the relation between inflation and informality.
However, none of these recent models addresses the two questions this chap-
ter attempts to answer, “What are the driving forces behind informal economic
activity in high-income countries?” and, “To what extent can differences in
these driving forces account for cross-country differences in the informal econ-
omy?”7 Providing answers to these questions is important for two reasons. To
start with, there exists little empirical work on the environment of the informal
economic growth; see for example Loayza (1997) and Sarte (2000).
7Busato and Chiarini (2004) is one of the few works that looks specifically at the informal
economy in a high-income country. However, the authors do not address the question of why
the informal economy exists, instead they study the business cycle dynamics of the Italian
economy assuming an exogenously less productive informal sector.
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economy in developed countries. Williams and Windebank (1998) compare lo-
cal studies of the informal economy in high-income countries and do not find
any clear patterns on earnings, type of workers, or their motivations.8 The
sparse and vague findings thus stand in contrast to the clear picture of the
informal economy in developing countries as an environment where low skilled
individuals, unable to enter formal employment engage in low-productive ac-
tivities.9
Secondly, whereas the costs of establishing a formal business seem to play
an important role for developing countries, no robust relation between the
”Ease-of-Starting-Business-Index” (Djankov et al. (2002)) and informality can
be established for high-income countries.10 Therefore, a focus on the fixed costs
for establishing a formal business does not seem to be adequate for the study
of the informal economy in high-income countries. Instead, an emphasis on
the role of tax rates and quality of governance, as in this chapter, seems more
appropriate for the proposed analysis, because across high-income countries
tax rates are clearly positively related to the size of the informal economy. For
a broader group of countries, however, there is no consensus about the relation
between taxes and the informal economy.11
The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section
presents the model in greater detail. I then describe my calibration strategy.
8For Germany, Schneider (2006) find that of those working informally 43% have a full
employment in the formal economy compared to only 6.5% who are unemployed.
9The International Conference of Labour Statisticians characterizes the informal economy
in developing countries as “consisting of units engaged in the production of goods and
services with the primary objective of generating employment and income to the persons
concerned.” (Paragraph 5).
10The initially positive relationship loses any significance when excluding Greece and
Portugal from the sample of 21 high-income OECD countries.
11For 49 countries Johnson et al. (1998) establish a positive relation between high taxes and
informal economy, whereas Friedman et al. (2000) looking at 69 countries argue that higher
taxes are related to better functioning public administrations and hence to less informal
economy.
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Section 1.4 presents the results. In Section 1.5 I perform a policy experiment,
and Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Model
The set-up follows Lucas (1978)’s span-of-control model. There is a single
representative household and a government in this economy. The household is
made up of a continuum of members with different managerial abilities.12 Ac-
cording to their managerial abilities, household members either become work-
ers or managers. Managers produce a homogenous good by using labor, cap-
ital, and their ability as inputs. Managers can operate a formal firm and pay
taxes to the government, or they can choose to operate an informal firm and
evade taxes. Tax evaders run the risk of getting caught, taxed, and fined
by the government. The larger their firm, the greater is the risk they face.
Given incomes of all household members, the household decides jointly about
consumption and savings.
Household The household is composed of a continuum of members. Its
total size is normalized to unity. The household lives forever and maximizes
the infinite sum of discounted utilities given by
∞∑
t=0
βtlog(Ct), (1.2.1)
where Ct denotes total household consumption at time t, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the
discount factor.
12 By assuming a single representative household I abstain completely from any effects of
occupational choice on the distribution of income, but focus on the effects on firm set-ups
instead.
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Endowments Each household member has one unit of productive time that
he supplies inelastically. Household members differ in their managerial abilities
(z). For each individual this ability is time invariant. It is distributed in
Z = [0, z] with cdf F (z) and density f(z). The household assigns occupations
to its members depending on their abilities. They can become workers, set up
an informal firm, or operate as formal entrepreneurs.
Production Both formal and informal managers have access to the same
technology. They hire workers, rent capital, and produce a single output,
which is used for consumption and investment, according to
Yt = F (z, nt, kt) = z
1−γ(kνt n
1−ν
t )
γ, (1.2.2)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the span-of-control parameter and νγ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital
share of production.
Formal managers Formal managers pay a proportional tax (τ) on profits.
They choose the optimal amount of labor and capital in order to maximize
their profits net of taxes. Given a wage rate (wt) and a rental rate for capital
(Rt), their problem is
max
{nt,kt}
pift = (1− τ)pit = (1− τ)[z1−γ(kνt n1−νt )γ − wtnt −Rtkt].
Combining the two first order conditions of this maximization problem, the
optimal capital-labor ratio for formal managers is given by,
kt
nt
=
ν
1− ν
wt
Rt
, (1.2.3)
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which is independent of the tax rate (τ). This implies that optimal profits of
formal managers are given by
pift (z, wt, Rt) = (1− τ)(1− γ)
1
1−γ z
(
γ(1− ν)
wt
) γ
1−γ
(
ν
1− ν
wt
Rt
) νγ
1−γ
. (1.2.4)
Higher wages (wt) and interest rates (Rt) reduce formal managers’ profits, as
do higher tax rates (τ) and a larger span-of-control parameter (γ). Higher
managerial talent (z), on the other hand, increases profits of the formal man-
ager.
Informal managers Informal managers do not pay taxes. They run, how-
ever, the risk of getting caught by the government. If they are caught, they
are taxed just as their formal counterparts. In addition they have to pay a fine
M . If their profits are too low to cover the fine, the government seizes their
total available profits.
Let p(z) denote the probability of getting caught for a manager of talent z.
I assume that this probability increases with firm size.13 Hence, p(z) is given
by
p(z) = 1
(1+e−
√
z)1/θ
with θ > 0 . (1.2.5)
Figure 1.2.1 shows the function p(z), bounded above at one. For a given z,
p(z) is increasing in θ, i.e. a higher θ is associated to a higher probability of
getting caught.14
13This approach is similar to Fortin et al. (1997) who assume costs of evading taxes and
regulations to increase with firm size. Note that there is a one-to-one mapping between labor
demand and managerial talent z, since n(z,Rt, wt) = zΥR
−νγ
1−γ w
νγ−1
1−γ where Υ is a constant;
a similar relationship holds for the demand of capital. Making detection depend on n or k
directly would distort input choices, which is not the primary interest of the current chapter.
14Note that Figure 1.2.1 is drawn for very small values of θ that arise in the calibration
of the model to data (see Section 1.3), hence p(0) ' 0.
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Figure 1.2.1: The probability of getting caught as a function of z
Then informal managers face the following profit maximization problem
max
{nt,kt}
piit = (1− p(z))pit + p(z) max{0, (1− τ)pit −M}.
Given that taxes are paid on profits and prices for inputs are the same for
informal and formal managers, input choices are not distorted and informal
managers’ optimal decision rules for labor and capital inputs are identical to
the ones for formal managers.15 Therefore, the optimal capital-labor ratio for
informal managers is also given by equation (1.2.3).16
Informal managers’ expected optimal profits are given by:
piit(z, wt, Rt) =

(1−p(z))
(1−τ) pi
f
t (z, wt, Rt) for M ≥ pift (z, wt, Rt)
(1−p(z)τ)
(1−τ) pi
f
t (z, wt, Rt)− p(z)M for M < pift (z, wt, Rt).
(1.2.6)
15As long as workers or capital owners do not know which firms pay taxes and which do
not, they cannot charge higher wages or higher rental rates of capital to informal firms.
16In contrast to Guner et al. (2008) and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) who consider how
policies distort input decisions, this chapter looks at firm specific decisions, to pay or to
evade taxes, given a common tax policy.
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Informal managers whose profits net of taxes are smaller than the fine for
evading taxes, lose all their profits if caught. They expect to make profits only
if they successfully evade taxes. In this case, their expected profits are equal
to the ones of formal managers before taxes. More talented informal managers
know that their profits net of taxes will suffice to pay the fine if caught. They
thus expect their profits to be a convex combination of before tax profits and
profits net of taxes minus the fine.
Given the functional forms of pift (z, wt, Rt) and pi
i
t(z, wt, Rt), there exist two
unique thresholds z?t and zˆt. Household members with managerial ability be-
low z?t will become workers. The income level of all workers is identical and
equal to the wage rate (wt). Those with abilities z such that z
?
t < z < zˆt will
become informal managers. Finally, members of the household with z > zˆt set
up formal businesses. Figure 1.2.2 captures this idea.
Formal managers‘ profits
Informal managers‘
expected profits
Workers Informal managers Formal managers
∗z zˆ
z
M−
w
)(zπ
Figure 1.2.2: Thresholds for occupational choices
Informal managers’ expected profits are a convex combination of before tax
profits and taxed profits minus the fine. Managers of talent z < zˆ face a low
probability of getting caught. That is why they expect to make more profits as
informal managers than as formal managers. As z increases, the probability of
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getting caught also increases and the two profit functions cross. Subsequently,
as p(z) → 1, informal managers’ profits become a linear function of taxed
profits minus the fine.
The Household’s problem The household chooses sequences of consump-
tion and savings, and the optimal occupation for each household member.
Formally the household chooses {Ct, Kt+1, Iwz<z? , I iz?<z<zˆ, Ifzˆ<z<z} in order to
maximize (1.2.1) subject to
Ct +Kt+1 = RtKt + (1− δ)Kt + Iwz<z?wtF (zt) +
+ I iz?<z<zˆ
∫ z
0
piit(z, w,R)f(z)dz +
+ Ifzˆ<z<z
∫ z
0
pift (z, w,R)f(z)dz,
and
K0 > 0.
The solution to the household’s problem is characterized by the following three
first order conditions
1
Ct
= β(1 +Rt+1 − δ) 1
Ct+1
, (1.2.7)
wt = pi
i
t(z
?
t , wt, Rt), (1.2.8)
and
p(zˆt)M = (1− p(zˆt))τpit(zˆt, wt, Rt). (1.2.9)
Condition (1.2.7) is the standard Euler equation for optimal capital ac-
cumulation. Condition (1.2.8) is similar to Lucas (1978)’ condition for the
‘marginal’ manager. A household member with managerial ability z?t is indif-
ferent between working or setting up an informal firm. His wage has to equal
the profits he expects to make as an informal manager.
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The additional condition (1.2.9) determines the second threshold for the
occupational choice. Household members who have not become workers, i.e
those with managerial abilities z > z?, face a second choice. They compare
their income as formal managers to their expected income as informal man-
agers. Whenever pift (z, wt, Rt) ≥ piit(z, wt, Rt) they go formal. Condition (1.2.9)
compares costs and benefits of being an informal manager. A household mem-
ber with managerial ability zˆ is indifferent between keeping his firm informal
or going formal. His costs equal his benefits of informality, where his costs are
the fine weighted by the probability of getting caught and his benefits are the
tax burden weighted by the probability of not getting caught.
Government The government collects taxes on profits from formal firms
and from those informal firms that are caught. In addition it collects the fines
from these same informal firms. In case these firms are not able to pay the fine
the government seizes their profits. Government revenues are used for pure
government consumption only. Each period the government has to fulfill the
following constraint
Gt =
∫ z
zˆt
τpit(z, ; )f(z)dz +
∫ zˆt
z?t
p(z)τpit(z, ; )f(z)dz +
+
∫ zˆt
z?t
p(z) min((1− τ)pit(z, ; ),M)f(z)dz. (1.2.10)
Equilibrium In equilibrium all three markets, i.e. for goods, capital, and
labor, must clear. Denote by n(z, wt, Rt) and k(z, wt, Rt) demands for labor
and capital services by a manager of ability z.17 Then for the labor market to
clear we require
Nt =
∫ zˆt
zt?
n(z, wt, Rt)f(z)dz +
∫ z
zˆt
n(z, wt, Rt)f(z)dz. (1.2.11)
17Recall that factor demands for informal and formal managers do not differ.
19
Two Essays on the Macroeconomic Analysis of Government
Policies and Entrepreneurship
Aggregate labor supply Nt = F (z
?
t ) has to equal the sum of the labor demands
of informal and formal managers. For the capital market to clear we need
Kt =
∫ zˆt
z?t
k(z, wt, Rt)f(z)dz +
∫ z
zˆt
k(z, wt, Rt)f(z)dz. (1.2.12)
With y(z, wt, Rt) being the supply of goods by any manager of ability z, for
market clearing in the goods market we require∫ zˆt
z?t
y(z, wt, Rt)f(z)dz +
∫ z
zˆt
y(z, wt, Rt)f(z)dz = Ct +Kt+1 −Kt + δKt +Gt.
(1.2.13)
We can now define a competitive equilibrium for the model economy. Given a
government policy {τ,M, p(z)} and a sequence of prices for labor and capital
{wt, Rt}∞0 , a competitive equilibrium is a collection of sequences
{Ct, Kt+1, Gt, z?t , zˆt, Iwz<z? , I iz?<z<zˆ, Ifzˆ<z<z}∞0 such that:
1. {Ct, Kt+1, Iwz<z? , I iz?<z<zˆ, Ifzˆ<z<z}∞0 solves the household’s problem;
2. all three markets, for goods, capital, and labor clear for all t, i.e. equa-
tions (1.2.11)- (1.2.13) hold;
3. the government budget constraint is fulfilled, i.e. equation (1.2.10) holds.
Absent any exogenous growth, there will be a steady state with all variables
remaining constant.
Two factors, tax rates and the quality of institutions, are clearly related to
the size of the informal economy across high-income countries (see Figures 1.1.2
and 1.1.3). These factors also play a key role in the model. The purpose of
this chapter is to assess the quantitative importance of these driving forces
behind the informal economy across high-income countries. In particular I
would like to answer questions like: “How much of the variation in informality
across high-income countries is due to different tax rates?” “Can different
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tax rates and differences in governance quality fully account for differences in
the informal economy across high-income countries?” The following sections
undertake the quantitative analysis needed in order to address these questions.
1.3 Calibration Strategy
Some parameters of the model are fixed a priori based on available evidence. I
calibrate the model’s remaining parameters by matching certain key statistics
to French data. France is chosen as a representative country because its aver-
age firm size, informal economy, and employment and establishment shares of
firms with less than ten employees are closest to the mean values of these four
variables across all 21 high-income countries.18
The tax rate (τ) in the model is fixed, based on available data. En-
trepreneurs’ profits are subject to income tax and only incorporated companies
are subject to corporate taxes. Hence as an estimate of the profit tax in the
model, I use what the OECD (2003) calls ‘tax wedge’. Data for this measure is
available for all 21 countries and includes income tax, employee and employer
social security contributions less cash benefits, applicable to a single individual
without children and earnings equal to that of the average production work-
er. To be able to compare my estimates to Schneider (2002)’s estimates of
the informal economy for 2001-02, I take an average over the annual rates for
both years. For the countries considered, between 40−60% of all tax revenues
stem from income taxes and social security contributions. Tax data used in
Figure 1.1.2 is for 1996 and taken from Schneider (2002) and combines ‘tax
wedge’ and value-added tax. Since the positive relationship between tax rates
18For average firm size, the size of the informal economy, and employment and estab-
lishment shares for firms with less than 10 employees, I compute the squared differences
between the mean values across all 21 countries and the values for each country. Then I
sum the squared differences across the four variables for each country. The calculated sum
of squared differences is lowest for France.
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and informal economy is robust over time as well as to the exclusion of value-
added tax, in the current exercise I chose to use more recent data for 2001-02
and to leave aside value-added tax rates.19 For the annual depreciation rate of
capital (δ) I pick the standard value of 0.1, as in Prescott (1986).
Next, I choose the technology parameters, the span-of-control-parameter
(γ) and the share of capital (ν) and I pick the fine for tax evasion (M), the
parameter for the probability function of getting caught (θ), and the discount
factor (β). I also specify the distribution of managerial ability F (z). I assume
that F (z) is log-normally distributed with mean (µ) and standard deviation
(σ).20 These seven parameters are determined by matching seven targets; i.e.
average firm size, employment and establishment shares of small firms, capital-
output ratio, capital share, the surcharge on tax evaded, and the size of the
informal economy for France. Table 2.4.9 displays calibration targets, next to
target values and the resulting statistics in the model.
According to the European Commission (2003) average firm size in France
was 8 workers per firm, excluding public enterprises and establishments in agri-
culture, fishing, forestry and hunting. I set the span-of-control parameter in
the production function (γ) to 0.748 to match this statistic. Employment and
establishment shares of firms are closely linked to the distribution of manage-
rial ability. In France, 37.1% of all workers are employed by firms that have 0
to 9 employees (micro firms). These firms make up 93% of all establishments
19The positive relationship between tax rates and the informal economy across high-
income countries is also robust to alternative measures of tax burden by Nickell and Nunziata
(2001). Given its collection mechanism, avoiding payments of value-added tax requires
networks of informal firms as in de Paula and Scheinkman (2007); with those avoiding taxes
only buying from and selling to others avoiding taxes. Other major taxes are corporate
taxes. However, across high-income countries there is no linear statistical relation between
corporate tax rates and the informal economy.
20Assuming that these parameters are homogenous across countries is a strong stand and
attributes all differences in informal economy to differences in policy. It is the adequate
stand point here as I want to answer the question, of how much different policy (tax rates
and institutions) can account for differences in informal economy.
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Table 1.3.1: Calibration Targets and Model Values for France
Target Model
Average firm size 8.0 8.0
Employment share of micro firms (0-9 employees) 37.1% 37.1%
Establishment share of small firms (0-9 employees) 93% 79%
Capital-output ratio 2.3 2.3
Capital share 0.319 0.319
Surcharge on tax evaded 80% 80%
Informal economy 15.0% 15.0%
(European Commission (2003)). In order to match employment and establish-
ment shares of micro firms in France I choose the mean log-managerial ability
(µ) to be 0 and set the standard deviation of log-managerial ability (σ) to
2.129.21
The discount factor (β) is set to 0.9628 to match a capital-output ratio
for France of 2.3 (Maddison (1995)). In the model, γν is the share of capital
income. Given γ, the parameter ν is set to 0.4265, to be able to generate
a capital share adjusted for labor shares for self-employed income of 0.319
(Gollin (2002)).22 I set θ to 0.00706 to match the estimate by Schneider (2002)
that 15% of GDP was produced informally in France in 2001-02. Next, I
determine the fine for tax evasion (M). According to standard procedures
of tax administrations, if firms are found to evade taxes deliberately, they
have to pay their tax debt and are fined in addition. Fines across the 21
countries considered range from surcharge on taxes evaded, to surcharge on
undeclared income, to fixed fines, or even imprisonment.23 The most commonly
21This simple functional form for the distribution of managerial talent has the shortcoming
that one has difficulties matching employment shares and establishment shares simultane-
ously. This can be achieved assuming an extra tail for very talented managers as in Guner
et al. (2008). However, as the focus of this chapter is on small informal firms rather than
on large firms, I stick to a simple log-normal distribution for managerial talent.
22The adjustment for self-employed income makes labor shares relatively constant across
countries.
23See OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy Administration (2006) for a detailed description on
tax administration procedures in OECD countries, including fines imposed for deliberate
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imposed fine among the countries considered is a surcharge on taxes evaded.24
In France, penalties for deliberate tax evasion range from 10-80% of tax evaded.
I fix the fine for deliberate tax evasion (M) to a value of 1.005 to match
an average surcharge on tax payable of 80%.25 Table 2.4.8 summarizes all
parameter values.
Table 1.3.2: Parameter Values
Depreciation rate (δ) 0.1
Span-of-Control (γ) 0.748
Mean log-managerial ability (µ) 0
Dispersion in log-managerial ability (σ) 2.129
Discount factor (β) 0.9628
Importance of capital (ν) 0.4265
Parameter for probability of getting caught (θ) 0.00706
Fine for evading taxes (M) 1.005
1.4 Results
Tax Rates and the Informal Economy Given parameter values of Ta-
ble 2.4.8, the model can be simulated with different tax rates to generate
cross-country differences in informal economy. Figure 1.4.1 displays the re-
lation between informal economy estimates by Schneider (2002) and those
produced by the model when only differences in tax rates are taken into ac-
count (Model 1). If all other parameter values are the same for all countries, in
particular if informal managers in all other countries face the same probability
of getting caught evading taxes as informal managers in France, the informal
tax evasion.
24In this model imposing a surcharge on tax evaded instead of a fixed fine would make
tax evasion independent of the tax rate and a function of the surcharge rate only.
25 Let s be the surcharge on tax payable, τpi∗. Then fixing M , tax rate, and average
before-tax profits of informal managers for the Benchmark country, one obtains the value
for s = Mτpi∗ .
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economy in most countries is lower than in the data. Thus, mean informality
in this specification of the model is more than three percentage points lower
than in the data (see column 2 of Table 1.4.1). For Netherlands, Germany,
UK, and Japan estimates of informality by Model 1 are close to the data. This
result suggests that for these four countries tax rates differences with respect
to France can account for relative differences in informality.
Figure 1.4.1: Informal Economy Estimates in Model with Differences in Tax
Rates Only vs. Data
Belgium
Italy
Greece
New Zealand
US
France
Germany
Spain
Australia
Austria
Canada
Denmark
Finland
UK
Ireland
Japan
Netherlands
Switzerland
Norway
Sweden
Portugal
0,0800
0,1000
0,1200
0,1400
0,1600
0,1800
0,2000
0,2200
0,2400
0,0800 0,1000 0,1200 0,1400 0,1600 0,1800 0,2000 0,2200 0,2400 0,2600 0,2800 0,3000
Schneider (2002)
M o
d e
l  w
i t h
 
D i
f f e
r e
n c
e  
i n
 
T a
x e
s  
o n
l y
45º
Data: Schneider (2002)
For Austria, Switzerland, and the US informality is overestimated, while for
the remaining thirteen countries Model 1 underestimates the informal economy.
Hence for most countries, differences in tax rates alone cannot account for
differences in informality. In particular, a model with tax rates as the only
source of heterogeneity among countries can only account for about one third
of the variation in informality across high-income countries. The coefficient
of variation for results on informality produced by Model 1 is equal to 33%
of the coefficient of variation for Schneider (2002)’s estimates of informality.
Hence, in order to better account for the variation in informal economy across
countries, differences in governance quality, the extent to which these tax rates
are enforced, have to be taken into account.
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Table 1.4.1: Informal Economy: Data and all Model Specifications*
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Data Taxes Gov. Taxes
Country Schneider (2002) Only Only + Gov.
Greece 0.285 0.137 0.226 0.214
Italy 0.270 0.146 0.189 0.186
Portugal 0.225 0.135 0.189 0.175
Spain 0.225 0.138 0.186 0.175
Belgium 0.220 0.155 0.138 0.144
Sweden 0.191 0.149 0.148 0.146
Norway 0.190 0.138 0.175 0.163
Finland 0.180 0.146 0.138 0.134
Denmark 0.179 0.143 0.148 0.141
Germany 0.163 0.153 0.161 0.164
Canada 0.158 0.128 0.140 0.117
Ireland 0.157 0.114 0.168 0.133
France 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150
Australia 0.141 0.119 0.148 0.116
Netherlands 0.130 0.136 0.144 0.130
New Zealand 0.126 0.099 0.158 0.107
UK 0.125 0.127 0.158 0.136
Japan 0.111 0.119 0.163 0.133
Austria 0.106 0.147 0.140 0.137
Switzerland 0.094 0.124 0.138 0.112
US 0.087 0.123 0.158 0.131
Mean Informality 0.167 0.135 0.160 0.145
Coefficient
of Variation 1.46 0.49 0.63 0.82
Mean squared
error 0.0034 0.0018 0.0017
Rank correlation
coefficient (Spearman) 0.48 0.41 0.77
*Countries appear in decreasing order of informal economy.
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Governance and the Informal Economy Governance quality means good
institutions and a high quality government that indicate that a country is co-
herently enforcing its policies and that tax evaders are caught with a high
probability. Corruption on the other hand poses an obstacle to the enforce-
ment of policies. Within the model, the parameter θ, governing the probability
of getting caught producing informally can be interpreted as a measure of the
quality of governance.
I take the calibrated value for θ and search for a simple mapping from the
French value for the GCI-Governance Index (GCIFr), into the calibrated value
for θ. In particular, I set θ = aGCIFr, where a is a constant.26 Then I apply
the same linear mapping to the GCI-Governance Indices for all other countries
to obtain a transformed index of governance quality θi, suitable for the model.
Given the simple linear transformation, these values are given by
θi = aGCI i.
Figure 1.4.2 shows the relation between informal economy estimates by Schnei-
der (2002) and those produced by the model specification that keeps tax rates
fixed at the French level and only varies θi across countries (Model 2). Col-
umn 3 of Table 1.4.1 reports the values for the informal economy produced by
Model 2.
Mean informality under this specification is closest to the data. Most coun-
tries’ informal economy estimates by Model 2 are on average closer to the
data than those produced by Model 1, reducing the mean squared error by
47%. The model’s coefficient of variation indicates that 43% of the variation
in informality across high-income countries is accounted for by a model in
which differences in governance quality are the only source of heterogeneity
26 With GCIFr equal to 0.57 for 2002 and the calibrated value for θ being 0.00706, the
constant a is equal to 0.0124.
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among countries. Across high-income countries, differences in the quality of
governance, the extent to which tax rates are enforced, seem to play a more
important role for explaining the variation in informality than differences in
tax rates. However, the model’s ranking of countries according to their infor-
mality compared to the data is worse when compared to Model 1, lowering
the rank correlation coefficient. And for the UK, Netherlands, US, Japan, and
Switzerland estimates of the informal economy produced by Model 2 are farther
from the data than those produced by Model 1. This suggests that to account
for some countries’ informality, relative differences in tax rates with respect
to France seem to be more important than relative differences in governance
quality.
Figure 1.4.2: Informal Economy Estimates in Model with Differences in Gov-
ernance Quality Only vs. Data
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Tax Rates, Governance, and the Informal Economy When combining
both, differences in tax rates and differences in governance quality (Model 3)
the model’s explanatory power is further increased (see Figure 1.4.3). Column
4 of Table 1.4.1 shows that the third specification of the model can account
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Figure 1.4.3: Informal Economy Estimates in Model with Differences in Tax
Rates and Governance Quality vs. Data
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for 56% of the variation in informality across high-income countries. In ad-
dition, the rank correlation coefficient improves significantly indicating that
the model is able to produce a ranking of countries according to their infor-
mality similar to the one in the data. However, mean informality produced
by Model 3 is lower and thus farther from the data than mean informality
estimated by Model 2. Furthermore, Model 2 estimates the informal econo-
my for more countries closest to data than Model 3. While Model 2 is thus
able to produce more individually accurate estimates of informality, Model 3
gives the best overall picture of the informal economy in high-income countries.
Model 3, the model with differences in tax rates and differences in governance
quality has the lowest mean squared error, 50% lower than Model 1 and 5%
lower than Model 2. Agents facing high tax rates have a strong incentive to
evade taxes. However, they will also take into account their country’s enforce-
ment of tax policy. If a country closely monitors its tax payers and controls
their compliance with tax laws regularly, agents will prefer to pay their taxes
upfront instead of later and together with a fine. Strictly enforcing its tax pol-
icy a country can counteract the positive effect of high tax rates on informality.
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Figure 1.4.4: Relation with Informal Economy: Tax Rates and Governance
Quality in Model and Data
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In addition, the model with differences in tax rates and governance quality
preserves the positive relationship between tax rates and the informal economy,
as well as the negative relation between informal economy and governance
quality (see Figure 1.4.4). The model’s results are robust to the selection of
the Benchmark country as well as to the choice of the measure of governance
quality.27
27In Appendix A.1.2 I provide an alternative calibration of the model to a different
Benchmark country, Sweden. Statistics for results of the model’s three specifications under
this alternative calibration are reported and discussed. In addition, statistics for results of
the original calibration that uses alternative measures of governance quality (Rule of Law
Index, Regulatory Quality Index, etc.) are presented.
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1.5 Policy Experiment - Reducing Informality
What is the most effective way to reduce informality? The answer to this
question might be of concern to policy makers in many high-income countries,
since informality raises concerns about fair and equal treatment of taxpay-
ers and also limits the possibilities of tax collection.28 But exactly by how
much does informality lower the ability of governments to collect taxes? Fig-
ure 1.5.1 shows tax revenues as a function of tax rates for the Benchmark
country (’French enforcement’) and a fictitious country where agents do not
have the option to produce informally (’Perfect enforcement’). In the presence
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0,5
0,6
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French enforcement Perfect enforcementτ 1
Figure 1.5.1: Effects of Informality on Tax Revenues
of informality, the higher the initial tax rate, the more difficult it is for policy
makers to increase their tax revenues by a certain amount. If taxes were 35%
in both countries and governments wanted to increase tax revenue by 20 units,
the economy with imperfect enforcement would have to increase tax rates by
more than 25 percentage points from 35% to more than 70%, while the re-
quired increase for a perfect enforcement economy is less than 20 percentage
28A third reason why policy makers might want to formalize economic activity is linked
to external observability. Financial market ratings of national debt are closely linked to a
country’s performance of its ’formal’ GDP and its tax base. A large informal sector reduces
both and might thus make issuing debt more expensive.
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points.
In the current model, if a country wants to reduce its informal economic
activity, it can opt for three strategies: increasing fines, reducing tax rates,
or increasing enforcement. Figure 1.5.2 shows the effectiveness of these three
strategies. Reducing informality by increasing the fine for evading taxes is
a costless policy measure but has strong limitations (see Graph (1) of Fig-
ure 1.5.1). For the case of France, increasing the fine by 50% or more (to
M ≥ 1.5) reduces informality by just one percentage point. Equally, lowering
the fine by 90% (to M = 0.1), leads to a mere increase in informal economy
by around four percentage points. Hence, informality is rather inelastic with
respect to fines. This should not be surprising since those firms evading tax-
es are small firms with low profits that cannot be fined more than their one
period profits. Informal firms’ one period profits thus put an upper limit to
the fine. Increasing fines infinitely high in order to achieve some reduction in
informality would seem like a straight forward policy recommendation. How-
ever, the recommendation while useful in the context of this model has to be
taken with care when put to practice. A future reduction in the total number
of firms might be an unintended consequence of this policy, because charging
all informal firms their total period’s profits may affect their ability to start
up a formal firm in the following period.
Graph (2) of Figure 1.5.2 shows the effectiveness of lowering tax rates in
order to reduce informality. The elasticity of the informal economy with re-
spect to tax rates is quite low. Given French enforcement standards, lowering
tax rates from an initial 50% by 20 percentage points to 30% leads to a mere
reduction in informality by just three percentage points, from, 15% to 12%.
The low elasticity of informality with respect to tax rates is again due to the
behavior of small firms. Given any positive tax rates, firms that are fined their
one period profits in case they are caught will always avoid paying taxes. A
reduction in tax rates does not affect their expected profits and thus neither
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Figure 1.5.2: Ways to Reduce Informality
their decision to go formal. In case these firms contribute to a great extent
to the informal economy the effect of a change in tax rates on the informal
economy will be low. On the other hand, reducing tax rates will always be
costly in terms of forgone tax revenues. Lowering tax rates from 50% to 30%,
given French enforcement standards, leads to a fall in tax revenues by 39%.
Finally, countries can reduce informality by improving their governance
quality and increasing the enforcement of their tax laws ( Graph (3) of Fig-
ure 1.5.2).29 Increasing enforcement seems to be the most effective way to
reduce informality. The elasticity of informality with respect to enforcement is
higher than elasticities of informality with respect to fines or tax rates. Given
29The United Nations (2006) recommend that “serious considerations should be giv-
en to developing the institutional capacities necessary for gradually formalizing informal
economies.”(pg.13)
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French tax rates and a value for θ of 0.007, increasing enforcement by 30%
leads to a reduction in informality by 26% from 15% to 11%. As enforcement
increases, expected profits of all informal firms shrink, independent of their
ability to pay the fine. In contrast to the other two policies for reducing infor-
mality, increasing the enforcement of tax laws thus affects the decisions of all
firms, making it the most effective policy among the three.
Switzerland is the country with the best enforcement technology or best
governance quality according to the Global Competitiveness Index, the Rule
of Law Index, and the GCI-Governance Index. Table 1.5.1 shows how countries
adapting Switzerland’s standards of enforcement can reduce their informality
by between 42% in Greece and 2% in Canada or Austria.30 On average infor-
mality is reduced by around 15%. However, increasing enforcement does not
only reduces informality it also leads to higher tax revenues. Increases in tax
revenues range from 8% in Greece to 0.2% in Canada.
1.5.1 Costs of Reducing Informality
Results in Table 1.5.1 show that countries can lower the size of their infor-
mal economy and achieve higher tax revenues by adopting Switzerland’s en-
forcement standards. Increasing enforcement, however, is costly. In order to
evaluate the policy of increasing enforcement standards to Swiss levels and
to be able to compare it to the alternative policy of lowering tax rates, we
need to estimate the costs of enforcement. The OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy
Administration (2006) provides information on costs of revenue collection as a
fraction of tax revenues, the fraction of wage costs in revenue collection costs,
and the proportion of staff assigned to ‘audit, investigation and other verifica-
tion functions’ and ‘enforced debt collection and related functions’. This data
30Finland, Switzerland, and Belgium all have the same enforcement strength and thus do
not experience any changes.
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Table 1.5.1: Changes in results when increasing enforcement to Swiss stan-
dards*
Reduction in Increase in Increase in
Informal Economy Tax Revenues Enforcement
Greece 41.9% 8.0% 87.9 %
Portugal 29.9% 4.7 % 44.2%
Spain 28.0% 4.4 % 40.9 %
Italy 27.9% 4.5% 44.2 %
Ireland 23.4% 2.8% 24.0%
Norway 22.9% 3.3% 29.2%
Japan 19.0% 2.3 % 19.2%
New Zealand 18.7% 1.9% 14.8%
US 15.5 % 1.9 % 14.8 %
UK 15.3 % 1.9% 14.8%
Germany 13.7% 2.0% 17.0%
Australia 8.4% 0.9 % 6.9%
France 7.9% 1.0% 8.8%
Denmark 6.9% 0.9 % 6.9 %
Sweden 6.5% 0.8 % 6.9%
Netherlands 4.8% 0.6% 5.1 %
Canada 1.6% 0.2% 1.6%
Austria 1.6% 0.2% 1.6%
*Countries are ordered by decreasing increase in enforcement required.
shows large variation across countries. While in the UK about 16% of staff
is assigned to enforcement related functions, in Japan 83% of tax administra-
tion staff is assigned to these functions. Whereas in New Zealand 58% of tax
administration costs are salaries, in Greece 86% of total costs are labor costs.
Costs of collecting taxes range from 0.42% of tax revenues in Italy to 1.8% in
Germany.31
In order to calculate enforcement costs for country i, let Ci be the costs of
collecting taxes as fraction of tax revenues, cwi the fraction of wage costs, and
Si the proportion of staff assigned to enforcement related tasks. Then define
31For the complete data see Table A.1.3.1 in Appendix A.1.3
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Cei = CicwiSi as total enforcement costs. I thus assume that enforcement costs
consists of the total wage bill associated with enforcements tasks while all other
remaining costs are assumed to be independent of enforcement. Let (1 + ∆θi)
and (1 + ∆Ti) be increases in enforcement and tax revenues associated to
adopting Swiss standards in country i respectively, as reported in Table 1.5.1.
I simply assume that
Ce
′
i /C
e
i =
(1 + ∆θi)
(1 + ∆Ti)
,
i.e. enforcements costs increase by the percentage increase in required en-
forcement per extra unit of taxes.
Given the cost function above, increases in total costs; i.e. increased enforce-
ment costs plus constant administrative costs can be estimated. Table 1.5.2
provides estimates for the increase in tax collection costs for 13 countries for
which data are available.32 Countries that need to increase their enforcement
more to reach Swiss standards tend to face a higher increase in costs (∆C ′i).
However, given the heterogeneity in enforcement costs this link is not perfect.
Denmark and Sweden both need to increase their enforcement by 6.9% to reach
Swiss standards. However, while this implies an increase in tax collection costs
of 1.7% in Denmark, Sweden faces a 2.3% increase in its tax collection costs.
This difference is due to the fact that in Sweden a larger fraction of tax ad-
ministration staff is assigned to enforcement tasks. On average, countries need
to expand their tax administration’s budget by approximately 4% in order to
carry out the policy of adopting Switzerland’s standards of enforcement.
However, this estimate may be downward biased if additional units of en-
forcement are more expensive than previous ones. Taking this into account,
I calculate an alternative estimate assuming that in all countries addition-
al units of enforcement are as expensive as in the country with the highest
32Data on Canada as well as more detailed information on Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ger-
many is not available.
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Table 1.5.2: Range of costs increase for increasing enforcement to Swiss stan-
dards
∆C ′i ∆C ′i ∆CMAXi
such as to leave
country specific with more expensive countries indifferent
additional units between increasing or
of enforcement not their enforcement
Greece - 53.55% 439.57%
Portugal - 30.35% 290.40%
Spain 8.19% 50.28% 454.8%
Italy - 109.24% 1030.13 %
Ireland 6.02% 27.05% 275.37%
Norway 5.32% 51.26% 507.43%
Japan 10.78% 10.78% 107.90 %
New Zealand 4.57% 18.37% 204.19%
US 3.66% 27.18% 302.45 %
UK 1.19% 15.01% 171.23%
Germany - 10.04% 104.60%
Australia 1.91% 6.12% 69.87%
France 2.67% 6.34% 65.95%
Denmark 1.74% 8.28% 94.26%
Sweden 2.31% 12.70% 139.83 %
Netherlands 1.16% 3.79% 40.87%
Austria 0.85% 1.83% 21.38%
enforcement costs, Japan. The second column of Table 1.5.2 reports these
alternative costs estimates (∆C ′i). While there are some exceptions, even by
these more conservative estimates for most countries raising their enforcement
to Swiss standards implies an increase in tax revenue collection costs by less
than 10%. Average costs of the policy that raises all countries’ enforcement
standards to the Swiss level are thus equivalent to at most 26% of the average
tax administration’s budget.
In order to provide a notion of the benefits of this policy, Table 1.5.2 shows
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percentage increases in tax collection costs that leave countries indifferent in
terms of tax revenues between adopting or not the policy of increasing enforce-
ment to Swiss standards (∆CMAXi). In most cases, for countries to actually
lose tax revenues when applying this policy, total revenue collection costs would
have to more than double. In the case of Italy, Greece, Spain, Norway, and
the US costs would have to more than quadruple for the policy to not be self
financing. On average ∆CMAXi is equal to 250%, suggesting that even by con-
servative estimates (∆C ′i), increases in tax revenues associated to the policy
of adopting Swiss enforcement standards are around ten times larger than in-
creases in tax collection costs. Thus, for most countries potential benefits of
increasing their enforcement standards to the Swiss level are large. Not only
will informality be reduced but most likely tax revenues will be higher even
after taking into account the increase in enforcement cost.
1.6 Conclusion
The informal economy in high-income countries is large. Most models of the
informal economy focus on developing countries where informality is linked to
issues such as dual labor markets for productive (formal) and less productive
(informal) workers, limited access to credit, and fixed costs of setting up a
business. However, the informal economy in high-income countries is different
because it is mainly linked to tax evasion. Among high-income countries, there
is a positive relation between tax rates and and size of the informal economy
and a negative relationship between informal economy and various indices of
institutional quality. In this paper, these two relationships, the positive one be-
tween tax rates and size of the informal economy and the negative one between
the informal economy and various indices of institutional quality constitute the
building blocks for a model of the informal economy in high-income countries.
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A calibrated version of the model quantifies the influence of tax rates and
governance quality on informality. It shows that differences in tax rates alone
can only account for approximately 33% of the observed variation in informal
economy across high-income countries, while differences in governance quality,
the extent to which these tax rates are enforced, can account for about 43% of
the variation. When combining both, differences in tax rates and differences in
governance quality, the model accounts for 56% of the variation in informality
across high-income countries.
Among the three ways to reduce informality – higher fines, lower tax rates,
stronger enforcement – the latter is found to be the most effective. If all coun-
tries were to increase their enforcement level by an average 20% and adopt
Switzerland’s level of enforcement, average informality across 21 high-income
countries would drop by around 15%. I estimate costs of increasing enforce-
ment and find average costs of this policy to be equivalent to at most 26% of
the average tax administration’s budget, one tenth of the average increase in
tax revenues associated to the reduction in informality.
In the simple model of informality presented in this chapter, government
authorities act myopically and purely mechanically, applying the same fine
with the same probability to firms evading taxes once or 100 times. In order
to model tax authorities actions more realistically, one might want to consider
a framework that incorporates fines for tax evasion or the probability of being
caught depending on an individual’s history of tax evasion. This extension
introduces an additional heterogeneity that varies along time and so will in-
dividuals occupational choices, i.e. firms’ entry and exit decisions. While it
is not clear how much this alternative framework will alter the quantitative
results of this chapter, it seems particularly interesting for the study of the
interplay between tax evasion and entry and exit of firms, which could be an
interesting road for future research.
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Chapter 2
Migration, Wages, and Parental
Background: Obstacles to
Entrepreneurship and Growth
in East Germany
2.1 Introduction
East Germany’s economic performance has been quite dismal for the last
decade. Since 1991, unemployment rates in East Germany and Berlin have
been twice as high as rates in West Germany, ranging from official rates of
15− 20% to unofficial rates of 25− 30%.1 Furthermore, while other transition
countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are growing to
catch up with the rest of Europe, East Germany’s economy is stagnating. Its
GDP per capita remains below 70% of West Germany’s (Statistisches A¨mter
1Unofficial unemployment rates take into account the so-called “hidden unemployed”,
individuals who do not appear as officially unemployed due to some form of active labor
market policy (training programmes, wage subsidies, early retirement schemes); for unofficial
rates: Sachversta¨ndigenrat (2007), for official rates: Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2008).
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der La¨nder (2009)). For the last decade, East Germany’s economy has grown
more slowly than the economies of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic
(see Figure 2.1.1).2
Figure 2.1.1: Growth Rates of Real GDP per Capita (chained)
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Data: Heston et al. (2009), Statistisches A¨mter der La¨nder (2009) (for East Germany)
Policy makers have identified fostering entrepreneurship as the key to em-
ployment creation and economic growth in East Germany: “The Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its Local Economic
and Employment Development Programme has been working with the Federal
Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs (BMVBS) since 2005 on
an analytical and practical project on Strengthening entrepreneurship in East
Germany as a critical lever for economic growth and employment creation”
(OECD (2007)).3
2Accumulated growth rates for real GDP per capita for 1992 to 2007 for East Germany,
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are 152%, 195%, 162%, and 163% respectively.
Indeed, Slovenia’s GDP per capita has already surpassed that of East Germany.
3 Numerous newspaper articles have pointed out that the development of the ’Mittelstand’
– the small and medium sized enterprise sector– is essential for the revival of the East
German economy. However, “in practice, the development of east Germany’s Mittelstand
is proceeding painfully slowly. Self-employment is still much lower than in west Germany.
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Less than twenty years ago, private entrepreneurial activity was extremely
restricted or even forbidden in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Hungary. However, today the lack of entrepreneurship seems to be persisting
still in East Germany, while other transition economies have managed to over-
come this hurdle.4
Table 2.1.1: Number of Enterprises
labor force employed
Number of Enterprises per 1000 inhabitants participants individuals
East Germany* (incl. firms
with zero employment) 37.2 72.4 87.0
Czech Republic 83.4 165.4 179.7
Hungary 55.3 132.5 142.8
Poland 37.0 81.7 99.3
Data: Eurostat (2005) (NACE: C-I;K), *Statistisches Bundesamt (2008)
Table 2.1.1 displays the number of enterprises per 1000 inhabitants, labor
force participants, and employed individuals for East Germany, the Czech Re-
public, Hungary, and Poland. There are significantly fewer enterprises in East
Germany, only 37 per 1000 inhabitants – this number includes firms with zero
employment – compared to 83 per 1000 inhabitants in the Czech Republic.5
When taking into account differences in labor force participation or unem-
ployment, East Germany has even fewer enterprises compared to some other
transition countries.6
Small businessmen in east Germany face a number of handicaps, mostly to do with being
new to the game;” (The Economist (1996)).
4In Hungary, liberalization of communist rules began in the 1970’s and by the 1980’s a
so-called ’second economy’ of privately owned businesses had developed. The private sector
was officially non-existent in Czechoslovakia but more important in Poland where family
farms dominated the agriculture (OECD (1992)).
5The number of firms per 1000 inhabitants in developed countries range from 14 in the
US, to 20 in all of Germany (excluding firms with zero employment) to 26, 30, and 37 in
the UK, Netherlands, or France respectively (OECD (2005)).
6Earle and Sakova (2000) point out that high rates of unemployment and little welfare
provision in transition countries might push individuals into self-employment and thus far
from being successful business owners these own-account workers differ little from the un-
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In 1990, with the end of the communist era, setting up a firm was legalized
and simplified, opening up a whole new set of occupational choices in East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. There was, however, a sig-
nificant difference between other transition countries and East Germany, as the
latter was integrated into the established economy of West Germany.7 In this
chapter I argue that three key aspects of East Germany’s integration into West
Germany hindered a fruitful development of entrepreneurship: migration pos-
sibilities to West Germany, the way East German wages were regulated upon
reunification, and a great importance of parental background for entrepreneur-
ship in West Germany.8
First, since 1989 the unrestricted mobility of East Germans has led to ma-
jor migration flows within Germany. Between 1989 and 2002 net migration
to West Germany amounted to 1.3 million people, an equivalent of 7.5% of
the original population of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) (Heiland
(2004)). The Czech Republic and Hungary, on the contrary were net recipients
of migration during 1990-1998.9 Especially young and skilled East Germans
are likely to migrate to West Germany (Hunt (2006a) and Ragnitz (2007)).
Between 1995 and 2007, 19% of East Germans aged 18 to 29 left East for West
employed. However, numbers in Table 2.1.1 refer to self-employed with employees, i.e. they
operate on a larger scale than that of mere subsistence, making it unlikely that many of
them are own-account workers escaping from unemployment.
7This obviously increased East Germany’s market size tremendously and if there were a
general correlation between large markets and low entrepreneurship rates this could explain
differences between East Germany and other transition countries. However, while the US,
has relatively few entrepreneurs, two other large markets, China (high entrepreneurship) vs.
Russia (low entrepreneurship) display stark differences in entrepreneurship rates (see e.g.
Bosma et al. (2009), OECD (2009)).
8Formal aspects of doing business are actually more favorable in Germany than in other
transition countries. However, as of 2009, starting a business is easier in the Czech Republic
and Hungary than in Germany, mainly due to a reduced number of days and procedures
involved (The World Bank (2009)).
9Migration to the Czech Republic and Hungary was mainly from other transition coun-
tries. Poland lost between 0.5% and 3.9% of its original population to migration between
1990 and 1998 (United Nations (2002)).
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Germany. Figure 2.1.2 shows that since 1998 East Germany has been losing
1-2% of its young population to migration each year.10
Figure 2.1.2: Net migration from East to West Germany for 18-29 year-olds
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Data: Statistische A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder (2007), excluding Berlin.
Second, presumably in order to restrict the number of East Germans mi-
grating to West Germany, West German labor unions pressed for parity of East
and West German wages (see e.g.Akerlof et al. (1991), Sinn (1991)).11 In 1991,
wages in East Germany were set to 50% of West German wages despite a lower
ratio of East- to West German labor productivities. By 1995, East German
wages had reached up to 70% and more of West German wages (Burda (2008),
Sinn (1991), and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Izem (2007)).12
10Compared to international migration rates, these are very large numbers; e.g. current
annual net migration rates from Ecuador and Mexico are 0.8% and 0.4% respectively (CIA
(2008)). It is very likely that numbers for Figure 2.1.2 are upward biased as individuals might
be counted more than once, migrating back and forth between East and West Germany.
However, this only happens in case of formal changes of residence and thus Figure 2.1.2 is
not contaminated by the presence of commuters.
11Officially, labor unions demanded wage equity out of concern for East-West German
equity and East German welfare.
12Between 1990 and 1997, wages in Poland and the Czech Republic relative to wages in
West Germany remained stable at around 10-20% (Sinn (1991)).
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Third, entrepreneurial parental background was and is decisive for occupa-
tional choices of West Germans. Pistrui et al. (2000) find that 60% of West
German entrepreneurs have a parent who had been an entrepreneur. Con-
trariwise in East Germany there was no past generation that could pass on
knowledge on how to run a business in the newly established market economy
and despite abundant government aids only few individuals in East Germany
set up their own business.13
The particular situation of East Germany, its poor economic performance,
and the contrast between the other transition economies and East Germany
raise several questions: Why do only few East Germans set up a business
in East Germany?14 And can the resulting lack of entrepreneurship in East
Germany be linked to low economic growth? What role does each of the pro-
posed key aspects of East Germany’s integration into West Germany play?
How do the unrestricted mobility of East Germans, the policy of fixing East
German wages as fractions of West German wages, and the importance of
entrepreneurial parental background in West Germany influence occupational
choices of East Germans and thus economic growth?
In order to address these questions, both qualitatively and quantitative-
ly, I build a model economy that places Lucas (1978)’ span-of control model
into an overlapping-generations framework. Individuals in the model econo-
my are characterized by their innate talent and their parental background.
Managerial knowhow is a combination of these two characteristics.15 Given
13 Between 1991 and 2005, East Germany received annual public transfers equal to
4.1% − 5.4% of West German GDP (Wurzel (2001), Hunt (2006b)). Transfers for sup-
port to enterprises and business-near infrastructure made up between 0.63% and 0.99% of
West German GDP (Wurzel (2001)). Sinn (1991) even speaks of negative capital costs for
investing in East Germany at the onset of transition.
14Diewald et al. (2006) study life-courses of East Germans after reunification and find that
transitions into self-employment between 1992 and 1996 have been “surprisingly rare”. In
particular, they find that “only 4.1 percent of our sample made this step during the Window
of opportunity [1/90-6/92], and 3.8 percent did so in the second period [7/92-3/96]” (pg.73).
15Managerial knowhow is obviously a multidimensional object and apart from parental
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their managerial knowhow individuals decide to be unemployed, to work, or
to set up a business. The innate talent of entrepreneurs determines economic
growth. Hence, there is a direct link between individuals’ occupational choice
and aggregate economic performance. After one generation each individual is
replaced by a child of random talent.16 Children inherit bequests and in case
their parent was an entrepreneur they also receive information about how to
run a business. As in Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora (2000), when technological
growth is low, there are few changes in the business environment and past
information about how to run a business is valuable. Managerial knowhow of
children of entrepreneurs will be higher. They will be the ones to set up their
own business, rather than the most talented individuals. Hence, talent is not
optimally allocated, individuals’ occupational choices exert a negative exter-
nality on economic growth and growth remains low. On the other hand, when
technological growth is high, past information depreciates fast, and manageri-
al knowhow will be determined by individuals’ innate talent only. The most
talented individuals become entrepreneurs, allocation of talent is optimal, the
externality is positive and technological growth remains high.
I first calibrate this basic model to West Germany before reunification, in
particular to pin down the key parameters governing the role of parental back-
ground and the link between entrepreneurship and growth. I then present an
extended version of the model economy that captures the integration of East
into West Germany. While both Germanies share capital and goods markets,
labor markets are locally separated. The government fixes wages in East Ger-
background and innate talent, empirical studies have highlighted for instance inheritance of
capital (Blanchflower and Oswald (1998)) and attitudes towards one’s own abilities (Arenius
and Minniti (2005)) as important factors influencing an individual’s decision to set up a
business. In this chapter I abstain from these and other additional important aspects and I
argue that to a large extent innate talent and parental background are able to pick up e.g.
aspects of parental wealth and personal attitudes.
16Zero correlation of talent between parents and children is a strong assumption. While I
will not provide results for alternative assumptions on this correlation, in the course of this
chapter however, I will indicate and discuss the effects of this assumption on calibration and
results.
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many above labor productivity and as fractions of West German wages and
finances a lower rental rate of capital for East Germany. Individuals can pay
a moving cost and work or set up a business in the other part of Germany.17
Wages set above labor productivity make becoming an entrepreneur less
attractive and East Germans choose to work instead of setting up their own
business. While East Germans’ general skills are comparable to those of West
Germans, they lack any parental background in entrepreneurship.18 Their av-
erage managerial knowhow is thus lower than that of many West Germans
who have learned from their parents how to run a business. Despite invest-
ment aids for setting up businesses in East Germany, the most talented East
Germans migrate to West Germany to set up businesses there. They thus con-
tribute to growth in West Germany, whereas in East Germany few mediocre
entrepreneurs imply low economic growth. Given too many workers and too
few entrepreneurs in an environment where wages are fixed, there is involun-
tary unemployment in East Germany.
Over time East and West Germany become more similar. But even though
relative moving costs decrease and spill-over effects cause total factor pro-
ductivity to converge, under the current integration scenario more and more
East Germans migrate to West Germany. The result is a constantly shrink-
ing East German population that is being reduced to immobile individuals.
Counterfactual experiments show that had East Germany integrated into a
social mobile West Germany, or had East German wages been flexible, or had
17I abstain from the possibility of commuting; i.e. for instance living in East Germany
and working in West Germany. This seems to be a common choice for East Germans (Hunt
(2006a)). However, for most individuals commuting is a temporary occupational choice as
they commute for a limited amount of time and /or as students, while in the model of this
chapter occupational and migration choices are permanent.
18Dunn et al. (1997) find no significant differences in economic returns to college and
vocational degrees between West and East Germans working in West Germany. Krueger
and Pischke (1995) estimate very similar coefficients for returns to years of schooling for
West Germans and East Germans working in West Germany.
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migration between East and West Germany been restricted, there would be
more entrepreneurs, less unemployment as well as higher economic growth in
East Germany. However, while flexible wages and a social mobile West Ger-
many would have also led to more output and higher economic growth for all
of Germany, migration restrictions are exclusively beneficial to East German
output and economic growth.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter builds on Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora (2000). The authors bring
forward various empirical evidence on the negative relation between rates of
technological and economic growth and the value of parental background. This
relationship implies a positive relation between rates of technological and eco-
nomic growth and higher intergenerational social and occupational mobility.
Kuznets (1966) writes on this matter :“One would tend to assume that internal
income mobility is more limited in stagnant or slowly growing countries, than
in those showing rapid growth; and there are implications also for the trends
in income mobility over the long span of growth within a country.”(pg.205).19
Both relationships between economic growth and social mobility and economic
growth and parental background arise in the model of this chapter and have al-
so been subject to a larger literature on economic growth, social mobility, and
the allocation of talent.20 According to this literature, entrepreneurial parental
background has a positive effect on entrepreneurship on the individual level but
negatively affects aggregate variables, as little intergenerational occupational
19According to Olson (1982) a rigid social class structure and low economic growth are
just two different ways in which a misallocation of talent due to rent seeking manifests itself
in a society.
20A seminal paper on the optimal allocation of talent and economic growth is Murphy
et al. (1991). Recently, the topic of the allocation of resources across productive units and
its implications for productivity and growth has received a great deal of attention, see e.g.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Guner et al. (2008), and Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) among
others.
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and social mobility is associated with low economic growth.21 Caselli and Gen-
naioli (2005) provide a model where missing markets result in the prevalence of
dynastic firms. As in this chapter, managers being selected according to their
family ties rather than their talent leads to lower total factor productivity. In
Galor and Tsiddon (1997), similar to this chapter, parental background and
growth are negatively related and as technology adoption evolves, parental
background gains importance, wages become more equal, and technological
progress slows down. In the model of this chapter a positive value for parental
background in entrepreneurship inhibits an optimal allocation of talent that
would maximize the externality of talented entrepreneurs on economic growth.
As in the recent literature on cross-border flows of managerial talent, the
model of this chapter allows for entrepreneurs to set up their business in the
other part of Germany. However, unlike results in Burnstein and Monge-
Naranjo (2009) managerial talent does not flow from West Germany, a region
with large ’firm-embedded productivity’ towards East Germany where labor is
abundant, because East German wages are set above labor productivity. And
even though the immediate implementation of West German regulations in
East Germany makes both regions’ entrepreneurial environments alike, West
Germans do not set up businesses in East Germany. Managerial talent moving
towards similar environments as in Pica and Rodr´ıguez Mora (2007) is again
obscured by the East German wage setting policy.
This chapter is also related to the vast literature that discusses East Ger-
many’s disappointing growth experience. Hunt (2008) provides a recent review
of this literature. There is a general consensus that the wage setting policy
21There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of entrepreneurship. Having
had a parent who was an entrepreneur is found to have a positive effect on oneself setting
up one’s own business. Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (1996) find intergenerational linkage in self-
employment to be stronger along non-financial lines than along financial lines. Arenius and
Minniti (2005) find that simply knowing other entrepreneurs is positively and significantly
related to being a nascent entrepreneur.
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has been the main cause for East Germany’s high unemployment rates (see
e.g. Akerlof et al. (1991) and Sinn (1991)).22 According to Snower and Merkl
(2006) high unemployment rates in East Germany are a consequence of the
wage setting policy in combination with generous welfare provisions. Canova
and Ravn (2000) also assign an important role to welfare provisions in magni-
fying the contraction of output and employment caused by differences in skill
level and capital endowment of East and West Germans. Burda and Hunt
(2001) claim a dampening effect of the wage-setting policy on migration. In
the framework of a labor search model, Uhlig (2006) argues that low network-
ing due to a lack of established production leads to a low productivity and high
out-migration situation in East Germany. Apart from the paper by Canova
and Ravn (2000) none of these authors provide general equilibrium models for
East Germany’s economic experience.
This chapter contributes to the literature by being the first one, to the
best of my knowledge, that explicitly models the link between a lack of en-
trepreneurship and low economic growth in East Germany.23 In the frame-
work of a general equilibrium model it applies the theory established by the
literature on social mobility and economic growth to the context of economic
transition. From the historical unique context of a generation without parental
background in entrepreneurship arises the natural question of its implications
for economic growth. This chapter tries to address this question and to provide
some quantification of the implications for the case of East Germany.24
22In addition, fixed wages impeded an offsetting of initial effects of the currency union
between West and East Germany.
23A recent paper by Bajona and Locay (2009) considers the period before transition and
establishes a similar link between a reduced stock of managerial knowledge and low growth
rates for planned economies.
24Conceptually this chapter is also related to studies that exploit the incidence of economic
transition as a natural experiment to study entrepreneurship as e.g. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2009)
and Earle and Sakova (1999). While these papers are empirical studies, this chapter exploits
this fact in a theoretical framework.
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The remaining of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents
the basic model that is thought to represent West Germany before 1990. This
model is then calibrated to West German data before 1989. An extended ver-
sion of the model that captures the reunification of East and West Germany
is presented in Section 2.3. This extended model is then calibrated to da-
ta after reunification and its results are discussed. Section 2.4 presents the
counterfactual experiments. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Basic Model (West Germany before Re-
unification)
Each period the economy is inhabited by a continuum of individuals of mass
one. Individuals differ in initial endowments of capital inherited from their
parents and in managerial knowhow. Managerial knowhow is composed of
innate talent and parental background. An individual’s parental background
refers to his parent’s occupation of either having been an entrepreneur or hav-
ing been a worker. According to their managerial knowhow individuals chose
to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs produce a homogeneous
good by using labor, capital, and their knowhow as inputs. Individuals live
for one period, during which they receive their parents’ bequests, make op-
timal occupational choices, lend or borrow capital, work, consume, and pass
on bequests to their children. Each individual has one parent and is replaced
by one child of random talent. Each period there is a mass L0t individuals
whose parents were workers, and a mass L1t individuals whose parents were
entrepreneurs, with L0t + L
1
t = 1. The government in this economy manages
an unemployment insurance and collects taxes.
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Preferences An individual born in period t derives utility from personal
consumption, ct, and bequests, bt, left to his child
U(ct, bt) = c
ω
t b
1−ω
t , (2.2.1)
with 0 < ω < 1. The parameter ω reflects the importance of personal con-
sumption for an individual’s utility relative to bequests left to children.
Endowments Each individual has one unit of productive time that he sup-
plies inelastically. In addition he is endowed with the bequest from his parent,
denoted by xt. Individuals also differ in their managerial knowhow (zt).
Managerial Knowhow Managerial knowhow is composed of innate talent
(q) and parental background (p). Innate talent is independent and identically
distributed across time and individuals in Q = (0, q¯], with cdf F (q) and density
f(q). Parental background is a variable that is equal to one if one’s parent
was an entrepreneur and zero otherwise, p ∈ {0, 1}. Managerial knowhow is
defined as the product of innate talent, (q) and parental background, (p)
zpt = q(1 + φtp),
where φt ≥ 0 reflects the value that being an entrepreneur’s child has for
an individual’s managerial knowhow in period t. The basic idea is that an
entrepreneur passes on information to his child about how to run a business.
This private information enhances an individual’s managerial knowhow.
Production Every entrepreneur has access to the same technology. He uses
his managerial knowhow (zpt ), employs workers of efficiency units (nt), and
rents capital (kt) to produce a single output (yt) used for consumption and
bequests
yt = F (z
p
t , nt, kt) = At(z
p
t )
1−γ+κ(kνt n
1−ν
t )
γ, (2.2.2)
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where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the span-of-control parameter and κ > 0 determines the
curvature of the entrepreneur’s profit function.25 The capital share of produc-
tion is given by νγ ∈ (0, 1). Capital depreciates at rate δ and At is total factor
productivity (TFP) which grows at rate gt.
Value of Parental Background Following Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora
(2000) the value of parental background, φt+1 is defined as a decreasing func-
tion of the growth rate of TFP
φt+1 = a(gt), (2.2.3)
with a(gt) ≥ 0 and ∂a(gt)∂gt < 0.26 Fast technological change implies that today
resembles yesterday less and that the value of private information inherited
from parents is being reduced. When TFP growth is high, past information
about how to run a business becomes completely worthless and everyone’s
managerial knowhow is solely defined by their innate talent
lim
gt→∞
a(gt) = 0.
Entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs choose optimal amounts of labor and capital
in order to maximize their profits net of income taxes (τ). For any efficien-
cy unit of labor hired entrepreneurs contribute τut wt to the unemployment
insurance. Given a wage rate (wt) and a rental rate for capital (Rt), the
25In the original Lucas (1978)’ span-of-control model wages are constant in talent and κ is
equal to zero. Following Chang (2000), in the model of this chapter unemployment benefits
are constant, wages are linearly increasing in talent and thus profits need to increase more
than linearly with talent which requires setting κ > 0.
26Instead, φt could be defined as a decreasing function of output growth. Given that the
steady-state growth rate of TFP is equal to (1−νγ) times the growth rate of output, results
will most likely be similar.
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entrepreneurs’ problem is
max
{nt,kt}
Πt = (1− τ)[At(zpt )1−γ+κ(kνt n1−νt )γ − (1 + τut )wtnt −Rtkt]. (2.2.4)
Combining the two first order conditions of this maximization problem, the
optimal capital-labor ratio for entrepreneurs is given by
kt
nt
=
ν
1− ν
(1 + τut )wt
Rt
, (2.2.5)
which is increasing in the contribution to the unemployment insurance (τut ).
The entrepreneur’s profits are
pit(z
p
t ; .) = (1−τ)(1−γ)A
1
1−γ
t (z
p
t )
1−γ+κ
1−γ
(
γ(1− ν)
(1 + τut )wt
) γ
1−γ
(
ν
1− ν
(1 + τut )wt
Rt
) νγ
1−γ
.
(2.2.6)
Higher wages (wt), higher income taxes (τ), higher contributions to the un-
employment insurance (τut ), as well as higher interest rates (Rt), and a larger
span-of-control parameter (γ) all reduce the entrepreneur’s profits. A higher
level of managerial knowhow (zpt ) on the other hand, increases profits of the
entrepreneur. Since
∂zpt
∂φt
≥ 0, profits are also increasing in the value of en-
trepreneurial parental background. Given the negative relation between the
growth rate of TFP and the value of an entrepreneurial parental background
(see Equation 2.2.3), low technological growth today implies higher profits for
children of entrepreneurs in the future.
Workers Workers supply their efficiency units of labor inelastically. Their
talent (q) is transformed linearly into efficiency units of labor so that their net
wage as workers is given by
(1− τut − τ)wtq. (2.2.7)
Workers also pay income taxes (τ). Mimicking the German unemployment
insurance, both employers and workers contribute the same fraction τut of
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workers’ gross wages to the insurance scheme.27
Unemployed Unemployed individuals receive a fraction ς of the wage rate
per efficiency unit as unemployment benefits (vt)
vt = ςwt,
which are paid independently of an individual’s talent.
2.2.1 Decisions
Individuals can choose to set up their own business, to become workers, or
to be unemployed. Given perfect foresight, they compare among potential
incomes from the three occupations and choose the one that maximizes their
income.28 Individuals also decide about consumption and bequests left to their
children.
Becoming an Entrepreneur Individuals compare their potential wage (Equa-
tion 2.2.7), to the profits they could make as entrepreneurs (Equation 2.2.6).
Whenever, pit(z
p
t ; .) ≥ (1 − τut − τ)wtq, they set up their own business. The
cut-off value of managerial knowhow (zˆpt ) describing the individual who is in-
different between working or setting up a business is given by
zˆpt =
(
(1 + φtp)
−1w
1−νγ
1−γ
t R
νγ
1−γ
t Ψ
−1
t (1− τ)−1(1 + τut )
γ−νγ
1−γ (1− τut − τ)
) 1−γ
κ
,
(2.2.8)
27For any worker of type q hired by a firm, the firm contributes τut wtq to unemployment
insurance and pays a gross wage of wtq to the worker of which the government automatically
deducts a fraction (1− τut − τ) for income tax and unemployment insurance.
28Note that parents’ decisions do not take into account that becoming an entrepreneur
generates a value of parental background and thus a possibly higher managerial knowhow
for their children.
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where Ψt = A
1
1−γ
t (1−γ)(γ(1−ν))
γ
(1−γ) ( ν
1−ν )
νγ
1−γ . The threshold of occupational
choice zˆpt , is decreasing in the value of entrepreneurial parental background.
Individuals whose parents were entrepreneurs set up a business at a lower level
of managerial knowhow than individuals whose parents were workers. When
TFP grows fast, the value of entrepreneurial parental background vanishes
(φt → 0) and the two thresholds for marginal entrepreneurs from different
family backgrounds coincide. Higher wages make being a worker more attrac-
tive relative to being an entrepreneur. As long as the capital share is restricted
to be smaller than unity (νγ < 1) higher wages increase the threshold of oc-
cupational choice, leading to fewer entrepreneurs. A higher rental rate for
capital reduces entrepreneurial profits and also increases the threshold. In-
come taxes (τ) and the contribution to the unemployment insurance (τut ) have
ambiguous effects on the occupational choice of individuals, because they re-
duce both, wages of workers and profits of entrepreneurs. However, profits
of entrepreneurs are affected less by an increase in any of the two as higher
contributions to the unemployment insurance are part of labor costs and as
thus deductible from profit taxes. Hence higher income taxes lead to more
entrepreneurs and as long as the share of capital in production is restricted to
values smaller than unity (ν < 1), higher contributions to the unemployment
insurance also reduce the threshold of occupational choice, leading to more
entrepreneurs.
Becoming a Worker Individuals then compare unemployment benefits (vt)
to their potential wage (Equation 2.2.7). The marginal worker, the individual
with talent qˆt is indifferent between working or being unemployed
qˆt =
ς
(1− τut − τ)
. (2.2.9)
This threshold is independent of both the wage rate and an individual’s parental
background. Figure 2.2.3 displays the thresholds of occupational choice for
individuals from an entrepreneurial family background and for those from a
57
Two Essays on the Macroeconomic Analysis of Government
Policies and Entrepreneurship
working family background.
Workers
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q
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Unemployed
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Figure 2.2.3: Thresholds of Occupational Choice
The Individual’s Problem An individual born in period t receives his be-
quest (xt) and chooses an optimal occupation that determines how he will
employ his labor endowment and his bequest. The individual then is unem-
ployed, works, or runs a business. Finally he consumes and leaves a bequest
to his child. Formally the individual’s problem is
max
ct≥0,bt≥0
cωt b
1−ω
t
subject to
ct + bt = xt(1 +Rt − δ) + Iuq<qˆtvt + Iwqˆt<q<zˆpt (q)(1− τ
u
t − τ)wtq +
+ Ie
zˆpt (q)<z
p
t (q)<z
p
t (q)
pit(z
p
t ; .).
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Individuals can lend their bequests to firms at the competitive rental rate,
Rt. The first order conditions of the individual’s problem give rise to the
following two optimal decisions:
ct(z
p
t ; .) = ω[xt(1 +Rt − δ) + Iuq<qˆtvt + Iwqˆt<q<zˆpt (q)(1− τ
u
t − τ)wtq +
+ Ie
zˆpt (q)<z
p
t (q)<z
p
t (q)
pit(z
p
t ; .)],
bt(z
p
t ; .) = (1− ω)[xt(1 +Rt − δ) + Iuq<qˆtvt + Iwqˆt<q<zˆpt (q)(1− τ
u
t − τ)wtq +
+ Ie
zˆpt (q)<z
p
t (q)<z
p
t (q)
pit(z
p
t ; .)].
The individual spends a fraction ω of his income on consumption and leaves
the rest as a bequest to his child. In addition to these two optimal decisions the
solution to the individual’s problem includes his optimal occupational choice.
2.2.2 Aggregate Economy
Aggregate Capital Supply Each period the economy’s aggregate capital
stock (Xt) is determined by the sum of all bequests from last period
Xt = L
0
t−1
∫ z¯0
0
bt−1(z0t−1; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t−1
∫ z¯1t−1
0
bt−1(z1t−1; .)f(q)dq, (2.2.10)
where bt−1 represent bequest decisions taken last period. Last period’s individ-
uals were either children of workers L0t−1 or children of entrepreneurs L
1
t−1.
29
29Given perfect capital markets and the warm glow motive for bequests in agents’ utility,
there is no need to follow the joint distribution of wealth and managerial knowhow in this
economy.
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Growth Rate The growth rate of TFP is defined as a one-period percentage
change in the level of TFP
gt =
At − At−1
At−1
.
Following Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora (2000), the growth rate of TFP is a
positive function of the innate talent of last period’s entrepreneurs relative to
the size of the population (Q¯t−1),
gt = h(Q¯t−1),
where
Q¯t−1 = L0t−1
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t−1
qf(q)dq + L1t−1
∫ z¯1t−1
zˆ1t−1
qf(q)dq,
and with h being some increasing function of Q¯t−1.30 The innate talent of
last period’s entrepreneurs is the sum of innate talent of entrepreneurs who
are children of workers L0t−1 and those who are children of entrepreneurs L
1
t−1.
Given these two groups of individuals and a fixed fraction of entrepreneurs in
the economy, Q¯t−1 is maximized by assigning occupations such that the span
of innate talent is the same for both groups, i.e. the least talented and the
most talented entrepreneur from both parental backgrounds have to coincide.
However, in case the value of parental background is high there will be more
entrepreneurs with an entrepreneurial family background. Hence, aggregate
innate talent of entrepreneurs will be lower and the individual’s occupational
choice thus exerts a negative externality on the economy’s growth rate.
30Hassler and Rodr´ıguez Mora (2000) reason the positive relationship between en-
trepreneurs’ innate talent and TFP growth as follows: ‘the higher the individual en-
trepreneur’s ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations, the larger
will the individual’s technological innovations be. This will create a feedback mechanism
whereby rapid technology growth creates an environment in which the sorting of individuals
to entrepreneurial positions is based on intelligence, not on social background.”(pg.889).
Note that population size is unity.
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Government The government collects income taxes from entrepreneurs and
workers and uses them for pure government consumption. Contributions to the
unemployment insurance scheme from both workers and entrepreneurs have to
be such as to fully finance benefits paid to the unemployed in each period.
Each period the government has to fulfill the following two constraints
Gt = τ{L1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
(yt − wt(1 + τut )nt −Rtkt)f(q)dq +
+ L0t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
(yt − wt(1 + τut )nt −Rtkt)f(q)dq +
+ L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
wtqf(q)dq + L
0
t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
wtqf(q)dq}, (2.2.11)
and
vt
∫ qˆt
0
f(q)dq = 2τut wt
(
L0t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
qf(q)dq + L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
qf(q)dq
)
. (2.2.12)
Equilibrium In equilibrium all three markets for goods, capital, and labor
must clear. Labor supply is given by the productive time of those individuals
who are neither entrepreneurs nor opt for unemployment. Denote by nt(z
p
t ; .)
and kt(z
p
t ; .) optimal demands for labor and capital services by an entrepreneur
born in period t who has managerial knowhow zpt . Then for the labor market
to clear we require aggregate labor demand
Ndt = L
0
t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
nt(z
0
t ; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
nt(z
1
t ; .)f(q)dq, (2.2.13)
to be equal to aggregate labor supply N st = L
0
t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
qf(q)dq + L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
qf(q)dq.
For the capital market to clear we require aggregate capital demand to equal
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aggregate capital supply
Kdt = L
0
t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
kt(z
0
t ; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
kt(z
1
t ; .)f(q)dq = Xt. (2.2.14)
With yt(z
p
t ; .) being the supply of goods by any entrepreneur of knowhow
zpt , for market clearing in the goods market we require
L0t
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t
yt(z
0
t ; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
yt(z
1
t ; .)f(q)dq = L
0
t
∫ z¯0
0
(ct(z
0
t ; .) +
+ bt(z
0
t ; .))f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
0
(ct(z
1
t ; .) + bt(z
1
t ; .))f(q)dq −Xt(1− δ) +Gt.
(2.2.15)
Aggregate consumption, bequests, and government consumption have to
equal the sum of aggregate production and the depreciated capital stock.
The law of motion for the mass of entrepreneurs is given by the following
equation
L1t = L
0
t−1
∫ z¯0
zˆ0t−1
f(q)dq + L1t−1
∫ z¯1t−1
zˆ1t−1
f(q)dq. (2.2.16)
We can now define a competitive equilibrium for the model economy. Given
an initial capital stock, X0, an initial fraction of entrepreneurs L
1
0, and their
talent, Q¯−1, a government policy, {τ, ς}, and a sequence of prices for labor
and capital {wt, Rt}∞0 , a competitive equilibrium is a collection of sequences
{ct(zpt ; .), bt(zpt ; .), Iuq<qˆt , Iwqˆt<q<zˆpt (q), I
e
zˆpt (q)<z
p
t (q)<z
p
t (q)
, zˆpt , qˆt, τ
u
t , Gt}∞0 for p ∈ {0, 1}
such that:
1. {ct(zpt ; .), bt(zpt ; .), Iuq<qˆt , Iwqˆt<q<zˆpt (q), I
e
zˆpt (q)<z
p
t (q)<z
p
t (q)
}∞0 solves the individu-
al’s problem for each p ∈ {0, 1} and for each t;
2. all three markets, for goods, capital, and labor clear, i.e. equations
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(2.2.13)-(2.2.15) hold for all t;
3. {(τut }∞0 is such that the unemployment insurance is self-financing, equa-
tion 2.2.12 holds for all t;
4. {Gt}∞0 is such that equation 2.2.11 holds for all t.
2.2.3 Calibration
Before presenting the extended version of the model economy that describes
the reunification of West and East Germany, I first calibrate the basic model
economy to West Germany before reunification. I fix parameter values for
preferences and technology and pin down key parameters governing the role of
parental background and the link between entrepreneurship and growth. Some
parameters are assigned values based on a-priori information, while others are
calibrated to match certain statistics of the West German economy before
reunification. I also specify the function h(Q¯t−1) that relates innate talent of
entrepreneurs and TFP growth and the function a(gt), relating TFP growth
and the value of parental background for entrepreneurship.31
Fixing Parameter Values For the mean log-talent (µ) and its dispersion
(σ), I use values of 2.11 and 0.58 respectively as estimated by Chang (2000)
using the US wage distribution for non-supervisory workers. A more regulated
German labor market and lower labor-market participation by low-skilled in-
dividuals make the use of a West German wage distribution less adequate for
estimating a distribution of talents. Factors other than underlying talent lead
to higher mean and lower variation in wages.32 The US wage distribution, since
it is less contaminated by policies, seems to be a better reflection of individ-
uals’ talent. The span-of-control parameter (γ) is set to 0.865. Using 3-digit
31One period in this economy is equivalent to one generation - 20 years.
32Gernandt and Pfeiffer (2007) estimate a wage distribution for West Germany for gross
hourly wages for prime age dependent male workers for 1984-1989, with mean 2.42 and
standard deviation 0.118.
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industry data, Burnside et al. (1995) estimate returns to scale in production
to lie between 0.81 and 0.92. I choose the midpoint of their values. Taking the
average over annual values for 1970-1989 for the ratio of depreciation of fixed
private capital over gross private capital stock gives me an annual depreciation
rate, δ of 4.6% (Statistisches Bundesamt (2006)).
The remaining five parameters are chosen to match the first five calibration
targets of Table 2.2.2. The importance of capital (ν) is calibrated to a value
of 0.3468 in order to target a capital share of 0.3 as reported by the Deutsche
Bundesbank (2001) for West Germany for 1970 to 1989. The parameter for the
relative importance of consumption in utility (ω) is assigned a value of 0.8035
to match an average annual capital-output ratio of 2.32 for West Germany
for 1970-1989 (Statistisches Bundesamt (2006)). The unemployment benefit
as a fraction of the wage rate per efficiency unit (ς) is calibrated to 2.649
in order to target an average unemployment rate of 5.4% for West Germany
between 1970 and 1989 (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2007)). The parameter
for the curvature of the profit function (κ) is assigned a value of 0.101 to
match the fraction of entrepreneurs in the model to a business ownership rate
of 6.9%, as estimated by Entrepreneurs International (Compendia (2002)) for
West Germany for 1972 to 1989.33 The parameter for the income tax rate (τ)
is calibrated to a value of 0.175 to match the ratio of tax revenues to GDP in
the model to taxes on income and profits as percentage of GDP of 12.2% for
West Germany for 1975 to 1990 (OECD (2006)).
Specifying Functional Forms The two center pieces of the model economy
are 1)the function relating entrepreneurs’ innate talent to technological growth
and 2)the function relating technological growth to the value of entrepreneurial
parental background for managerial knowhow. The model’s results are essen-
33In this data set business owners include self-employed and owners/managers of incor-
porated businesses whose income includes profits as well as a salary. Unpaid family workers
are excluded. The business ownership rate is constructed by dividing the number of business
owners by the total labor force. Data is available from 1972 onwards.
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Table 2.2.2: Calibration Targets
Data Model
Capital Share (1970-1989) 0.3 0.3
Capital-Output Ratio (1970-1989) 2.32 2.32
Unemployment Rate (1970-1989) 5.4% 5.4%
Business Ownership Rate (1972-1989) 6.9% 6.9%
Tax Revenues to GDP (1975-1990) 12.2% 12.2%
Average Annual Growth Rate of GDP (1971-1989) 2.26% 2.26%
Percentage of Entrepreneur with Entrepreneurial Parent (1997) 60% 60%
tially determined by the functional forms and parameter values assigned to
these functions. Careful calibration is thus crucial for obtaining sensible re-
sults for the basic model as well as for the extended version of the model
economy.34
I specify the function h(Q¯t−1) relating innate talent of entrepreneurs to the
growth rate of TFP as follows:
gt = h(Q¯t−1) =
1
(1 + e−Q¯t−1)1/α
.
To obtain a positive relationship between innate talent of entrepreneurs and
technological growth, α ≥ 0 has to hold. I choose α equal to 0.22 to match that
between 1971 and 1989 real West German GDP per capita grew at an average
annual rate of 2.26% (Statistisches Bundesamt (2006)). Finally, I specify the
function a(gt) that relates TFP growth to the value of entrepreneurial parental
background
φt+1 = a(gt) =
φ¯
1 + gt
,
where φ¯ is a parameter. This parameter is assigned a value of 0.957 to match
34Figures A.2.1.1 and A.2.1.2 of Appendix A.2.1 provide a sensitivity analysis for these
two key parameters.
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the intergenerational persistence in occupations.35 According to Pistrui et al.
(2000) 60% of West German entrepreneurs have a parent who had been an
entrepreneur. I set the calibration target for the percentage of entrepreneurs
whose parents were entrepreneurs to 60%. Table 2.2.3 reports all parameter
values.36
Table 2.2.3: Parameters
Mean Log Talent (µ) 2.11
Dispersion in Log Talent (σ) 0.58
Span-of-Control (γ) 0.865
Annual Depreciation Rate (δ) 0.046
Importance of Capital (ν) 0.3468
Relative Importance of Consumption in Utility (ω) 0.8035
Unemployment Benefit (ς) 2.649
Curvature of Profit Function(κ) 0.101
Income Tax (τ) 0.175
Parameters for Functions:
Relating Entrepreneurs’ Talent to Growth ( α ) 0.22
Relating Growth to Value of Parental Background ( φ¯ ) 0.957
I simulate the model economy until convergence to a balanced growth path.
The model hits its calibration targets of Table 2.2.2 well. In addition, the
model is also able to generate statistics on average firm size, unemployment
benefits to mean nominal wage, and contributions to unemployment insurance
in line with data.37
35Zero correlation of talent between parents and children requires assigning a relatively
high value to φ¯ in order to be able to account for the persistence in occupations.
36Appendix A.2.2 provides a discussion on the calibration target for the intergenerational
persistence of occupations.
37See Appendix A.2.3 for details.
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2.3 Extended Model (Reunified Germany)
Having presented the basic framework I am now ready to extent the model
economy to account for aspects of reunification in order to be able to address
the two main questions of this chapter: Did East Germany’s integration into
an established economy - West Germany - hinder a fruitful development of
entrepreneurship? And did the resulting lack of entrepreneurship affect eco-
nomic growth in East Germany?
In this chapter, the German reunification is modeled as the economic in-
tegration of a smaller region into a larger one. Both regions share common
goods and capital markets, but their labor markets are locally separated. The
government fixes wages in East Germany at a fraction (1−λt) of West German
wages and governmental investment aids lower the rental rate for capital in
East Germany to R∗t = (1 − χt)Rt. Initially, TFP in East Germany is lower
than in West Germany (A∗t < At). The economy’s aggregate capital stock is
given by the sum of the two capital stocks. In contrast to West Germans, all
East Germans of the first generation after reunification are children of work-
ers. Paying a fixed moving cost individuals can opt for working or setting up
a business in the other part of Germany.38 In each region there is a fraction
of θ individuals who are mobile and a fraction of (1 − θ) individuals who are
immobile. Immobile individuals face infinitely high moving costs (ηht = ∞)
and more mobile individuals face lower moving costs (ηlt).
39 The distribution
of innate talent f(q), is identical for East and West Germans.
38Individuals migrate with their children and thus depending on migration and occupa-
tional choices made by the first generation of East Germans, their offspring will be East or
West German children of workers or entrepreneurs.
39I introduce this additional heterogeneity to account for reasons other than wage dif-
ferentials or education (here ≈ innate talent) that induce migration decisions from East to
West Germany, e.g. age, family ties (see e.g. Burda (1993))
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2.3.1 West Germans
Upon reunification West Germans can migrate to East Germany and set up
a business there, taking advantage of the lower labor cost and a lower rental
rate of capital. However, TFP in East Germany is lower and moving requires
the payment of a fixed cost. No West German migrates to East Germany to
work there, as wages in East Germany are lower. Given a fixed cost for moving
from West to East Germany (ηjt ) with j ∈ {h, l}, a wage rate for East Germany
(1− λt)wt, and a reduced rental rate for capital (1 − χt)Rt, the problem of a
West German who sets up his business in East Germany is
max
{nt,kt}
Πt = (1−τ)[A∗t (zpt )1−γ+κ(kνt n1−νt )γ−(1−λt)(1+τut )wtnt−(1−χt)Rtkt−ηjt ].
(2.3.1)
Smaller discounts on wages (λt) and on the rental rate of capital (χt) as well as
higher moving costs (ηjt ), reduce profits of West Germans who set up their busi-
nesses in East Germany.40 Their optimal profits are denoted by pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .).
Individuals in West Germany compare their potential profits from setting up
a business in East Germany to the potential incomes resulting from the previ-
ously discussed occupations. They compare profits from setting up a business
in East Germany (Equation 2.3.1) to profits they can make as entrepreneurs
in West Germany (Equation 2.2.6). The cut-off value of managerial knowhow
z˜t
p,j, describes the individual who is indifferent between setting up his business
in West or East Germany
z˜t
p,j =
ηjt (wt(1 + τut ) (1−ν)γ1−γ R νγ1−γt Ψ−1t
(
A∗t
At(1− λt)
(1−ν)γ
1−γ (1− χt)
νγ
1−γ
− 1
)−1
1−γ
1−γ+κ
.
(2.3.2)
This threshold of occupational choice is independent of an individual’s
parental background, z˜t
p,j = z˜t
j. Higher moving cost (ηjt ), a lower discount on
wages (λt), and a lower discount on the rental rate of capital (χt), all reduce
40Moving costs are assumed to be deductible from profit taxes.
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entrepreneurial income in East Germany and thus raise the threshold.
As managerial knowhow is defined in the interval zpt ∈ (0, z¯pt ] this threshold
needs to be strictly positive, i.e:
A∗t
At(1− λt)
(1−ν)γ
1−γ (1− χt)
νγ
1−γ
− 1 > 0.
This is the case only if
(1− λt)(1−ν)γ(1− χt)νγ < A
∗
t
At
1−γ
.
Only if the discount on wages and the discount on the rental rate of capital
are large enough to offset the reduced TFP in East Germany do West German
individuals prefer to set up a business in East Germany over setting it up in
West Germany. If discounts are too small, or differences in TFP are large, no
West German individual opts for setting up his business in East Germany. In
this case, or if moving costs are very large, or if there are no mobile individuals,
thresholds of occupational choices for West Germans after reunification remain
unaltered and are as displayed in Figure 2.2.3.41
2.3.2 East Germans
For East Germans, reunification implies free occupational choices. They can
decide to set up their own business, to become a worker, to be unemployed, or
they can migrate to West Germany to work or to set up a business there.42
41See Appendix A.2.4 for additional comparisons West Germans make to choose their
optimal occupation.
42East German unemployed receive the same benefits as West German unemployed, hence
for them the option to migrate to West Germany is never better than staying in East
Germany, given that migration is costly. As of 2007, social welfare benefits are the same
in East and West Germany but already in 1992 East German benefits were just 4% below
those of West Germany (Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales (2008)).
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East German Workers East Germans have full knowledge of the wage
setting policy. With a certain probability ψt, they rationally expect to be
involuntarily unemployed when choosing to work in East Germany.43 East
German workers earn a fraction (1 − λt) of West German wages and both
voluntary and involuntary unemployed East Germans receive unemployment
benefits vt.
44 Thus expected income of those staying in East Germany to work
is given by
(1− ψt)(1− τut − τ)(1− λt)wtq + ψtvt. (2.3.3)
East Germans who migrate to West Germany to work there earn the same
wage as West Germans, less a moving cost η∗,jt
(1− τut − τ)wtq − η∗,jt . (2.3.4)
East German Entrepreneurs East German entrepreneurs face the follow-
ing profit maximization problem
max
{nt,kt}
Πt = (1− τ)[A∗t (zpt )1−γ+κ(kνt n1−νt )γ− (1−λt)(1 + τut )wtnt− (1−χt)Rtkt].
(2.3.5)
Greater gaps between East and West German wages (λt), and East and West
German rental rates of capital (χt) increase profits of East German entrepreneurs.
Denote their optimal profits by pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t ; .). East Germans who set up a busi-
ness in West Germany face the following profit maximization problem
max
{nt,kt}
Πt = (1− τ)[At(zpt )1−γ+κ(kνt n1−νt )γ − (1 + τut )wtnt−Rtkt− η∗,jt ]. (2.3.6)
43One might argue that initially East Germans did not have any notion of unemployment
as many authors have described that under the communist regimes, the “threat of unem-
ployment was therefore virtually nil[...]” (Roland (2000), pg.9). or that East Germany was
“ a society in which unemployment was never experienced as a direct threat to the individu-
al”, Pohl (1996)(pg.64). However, given that periods are equal to one generation the model
cannot accommodate a process of learning during one’s lifetime and thus it seems sensible
to assume that East German’s form rational expectations.
44Note that given this uncertainty, the individual problem for the East German thus
corresponds to maximizing his expected utility, Et[U(ct, bt)].
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Higher moving costs (η∗,jt ) reduce profits of East Germans who set up a business
in West Germany. Higher West German TFP (At) on the other hand, increases
their profits. Denote their optimal profits by pit(z
p
t , At, η
∗,j
t ; .).
Occupational Choices East Germans compare potential incomes from be-
ing unemployed, working or setting up a business in East Germany, and work-
ing or setting up a business in West Germany. Figure 2.3.4 displays one possible
realization of four thresholds of occupational choice for mobile East Germans
of the first generation after reunification.45
Entrepreneurs 
going West
l
t
,∗η
Workers
)(ˆ ,0, qz lt
∗
tttt
u
tt vqw ψλττψ +−−−− )1)(1)(1(
;.),( *0 ttt Azπ
Entrepren
eurs q
tv
Unemployed
*ˆtq
l
tt
u
t qw
,)1( ∗−−− ηττ
Workers going  West
l
tq
,~∗
;.),,( ,0 ltttt Az
∗ηπ
)(~ ,0, qz lt
∗
Figure 2.3.4: Possible thresholds for occupational choice for mobile East Ger-
mans of first generation after reunification.
45In order to keep the discussion tractable I only discuss income comparisons relevant for
the case displayed in Figure 2.3.4. For additional comparisons East Germans make to choose
their optimal occupation see Appendix A.2.4.
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East German individuals compare their potential wage in West Germany
(Equation 2.3.4) to the wage they can earn in East Germany (Equation 2.3.3).
The cut-off value, q˜t
j, describes the East German individual who is indifferent
between working in East or West Germany
q˜t
j =
ψtςwt + η
∗,j
t
(1− τut − τ)(ψt + λt − ψtλt)wt
. (2.3.7)
Higher moving cost (η∗,jt ) reduce labor income in West Germany and thus the
benefits from migration and raise the threshold as well as do higher wages in
East Germany, a lower λt. A positive possibility of involuntary unemployment
ψt, reduces the potential income of working in East Germany and thus lowers
the threshold. Comparing their potential wage in West Germany to the profits
they can make as entrepreneurs, East Germans set up their own business in
East Germany whenever, pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t ; .) ≥ (1 − τut − τ)wtq − η∗,jt . The cut-off
value, zˆ∗,p,jt , describes the East German individual who is indifferent between
working in West Germany or setting up a business in East Germany.46 Fur-
thermore, East Germans measure profits they can make as entrepreneurs in
East Germany, against profits they can make setting up their business in West
Germany. The cut-off value, z˜t
∗,p,j describes the East German individual who
is indifferent between setting up his business in East or West Germany
z˜t
∗,p,j =
η∗jt (wt(1 + τut )) (1−ν)γ1−γ R νγ1−γt Ψ−1t
(
1− A
∗
t
At(1− λt)
(1−ν)γ
1−γ (1− χt)
νγ
1−γ
)−1
1−γ
1−γ+κ
.
(2.3.8)
This threshold of occupational choice is independent of the individual’s parental
46 Note that the profit function for entrepreneurs in East Germany and the function
for wage income in West Germany might cross twice. Initially being an entrepreneur in
East Germany is always better than working in West Germany, due to fixed moving costs.
However, with increasing talent wage income increases and individuals are able to pay the
fixed costs and thus might prefer to work in West Germany instead of setting up a business
in East Germany. Given increasing returns to knowhow for entrepreneurs, there might
exist a second threshold where setting up a business in East Germany becomes again more
attractive as opposed to working in West Germany, (zˆ∗,0,lt (q) in Figure 2.3.4) .
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background, z˜t
∗,p,j = z˜t∗,j. Higher moving cost (η
∗,j
t ) reduce entrepreneurial
income in West Germany and increase the threshold. Higher wages in East
Germany on the other hand, a lower λt, reduce entrepreneurial income in East
Germany and thus lower the threshold as does a higher rental rate for capital,
a lower χt. This threshold is positive only if
(1− λt)(1−ν)γ(1− χt)νγ > A
∗
t
At
1−γ
.
Only if the discount on wages and the discount on the rental rate of capital
are small enough to not offset the higher TFP in West Germany do East
German individuals decide to set up a business in West Germany. Finally,
individuals also compare the unemployment benefit vt to their potential wage
in East Germany (Equation 2.3.3). The cut-off value qˆ∗t , describing the East
German individual who is indifferent between working in East Germany or
being unemployed is given by
qˆ∗t =
ς
(1− τut − τ)(1− λt)
. (2.3.9)
2.3.3 Aggregate Economy
Lemma 2.3.1 There exists no equilibrium after reunification in which both,
West and East German individuals become entrepreneurs in both, East and
West Germany.47
There will hence only exist equilibria with either East Germans setting up
businesses in East and West Germany or West Germans setting up businesses
in East and West Germany.
Growth Rates The growth rate of East German TFP is defined as a positive
function of the innate talent of entrepreneurs setting up a business in East
47For the proof of Lemma 2.3.1 see Appendix A.2.6.
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Germany (Q¯∗t) relative to P
∗
t+1, the East German population of next period,
i.e. after migration decisions have been taken
g∗t+1 = h(Q¯∗t/P
∗
t+1).
Analogously, the growth rate of West German TFP depends positively on the
innate talent of entrepreneurs setting up a business in West Germany (Q¯t),
gt+1 = h(Q¯t/Pt+1).
Government After reunification, the government collects income taxes in
both, East and West Germany. The government also fixes the discount on
East German wages (λt) as well as the discount on the rental rate of capital in
East Germany (χt). Government tax revenues are used to finance the difference
in the rental rate to lenders but the government cannot run a deficit.48 Each
period contributions to the unemployment insurance from both workers and
entrepreneurs in East and West Germany have to be such as to fully finance
all unemployment benefits. Let Kd,∗t be aggregate capital demand in East
Germany, Wt denotes aggregate net wages of the economy, Πt are aggregate
after-tax profits, and UBt are aggregate unemployment benefits. Each period
the government has to fulfill the following two constraints
Gt + χtRtK
d,∗
t = τ(Πt +Wt)− ττut Wt, (2.3.10)
with Gt ≥ 0 ∨t, and
UBt = 2τ
u
t Wt. (2.3.11)
Equilibrium Given that East German wages are fixed above labor produc-
tivity, equilibria after reunification are characterized by involuntary unemploy-
48In none of the calibrated versions of the model economy is the restriction on zero debt
binding; i.e. investment aids never exceed tax revenues.
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ment in East Germany.49 I require that for an equilibrium there be market
clearing in the common markets for goods and capital, and in at least the
labor market in West Germany. I allow for the possibility of closure of the
East German labor market. Denote aggregate labor demand in East and West
Germany by Nd,∗t and N
d
t respectively. N
s,∗
t and N
s
t are aggregate labor supply
in East and West Germany. Aggregate capital demand in West Germany is
denoted by Kdt . Let Y
s,∗
t and Y
s
t be aggregate supply of goods in East and
West Germany respectively. Aggregate capital supply after reunification, Xt
is given by the sum of the initial capital stocks of West and East Germany.
For the capital market to clear we require
Xt = Kt = K
d,∗
t +K
d
t . (2.3.12)
For the goods market to clear the following has to hold
Y s,∗t + Y
s
t = ω{Πt +Wt + UBt + (1 +Rt − δ)Xt}+ (1− ω){Πt +Wt +
+ UBt + (1 +Rt − δ)Xt}+Gt + χtRtKd,∗t +
+ Ξt − (1− δ)Xt. (2.3.13)
Aggregate consumption, aggregate bequests, government consumption, and
aggregate moving costs (Ξt) have to equal the sum of production and the
depreciated aggregate capital stock.50 The labor market in West Germany has
to clear, i.e. aggregate labor supply has to equal aggregate labor demand
N st = N
d
t . (2.3.14)
49Involuntary unemployment is assigned randomly. As entrepreneurs hire ’efficiency units’
they are indifferent between hiring few very capable or many less efficient workers.
50See Appendix A.2.5 for the explicit aggregation of the intelligence of entrepreneurs, the
components of the two government constraints, the components of the equilibrium equations,
an explicit definition of aggregate moving costs, as well as for the laws of motions for
entrepreneurs in East and West Germany.
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We require the labor market in East Germany to be in positive net supply
N s,∗t ≥ Nd,∗t . (2.3.15)
Aggregate labor supply has to be bigger or equal aggregate labor demand.
In case the difference between supply and demand in the East German labor
market is positive, there is involuntary unemployment.51 In equilibrium the
probability of involuntary unemployment expected by East Germans, ψt has
to equal the realized rate of involuntary unemployment, i.e.
ψt =
N s,∗t −Nd,∗t
P ∗t+1
. (2.3.16)
We can now define an equilibrium for the model economy after reunifi-
cation.52 Given an initial aggregate capital stock Xt, an initial fraction of
entrepreneurs L1t for West Germany, and their talent Qt−1, a government pol-
icy, {τ, ς, λt, χt}, moving costs {ηjt , η∗,jt } for j ∈ {h, l} and prices for labor and
capital as well as a probability of involuntary unemployment in East Germany
{wt, Rt, ψt}, an equilibrium is a collection of
{ct(zpt , ηjt ; .), ct(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), bt(zpt , ηjt ; .), bt(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), I,
, I∗, zˆp,jt , zˆ
∗,p,j
t , qˆt, qˆ
∗
t , z˜t
j, z˜∗,jt , q˜
j
t , τ
u
t , Gt},
for p ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {h, l} such that:
1. {ct(zpt , ηjt ; .), bt(zpt , ηjt ; .), I} solves the individual’s problem for West Ger-
mans of types p ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {h, l};
51 Migration and occupational choices are only altered until expected involuntary un-
employment is equal to the realized rate. An individual who finds himself involuntarily
unemployed cannot reconsider his choice.
52Contrariwise to the equilibrium for West Germany before reunification, the equilibrium
after reunification is not competitive, given the imposed wage in the East German labor
market. For tractability, indicator functions of occupational choice for West Germans (I)
and East Germans (I∗) are not explicitly stated.
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2. {ct(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), bt(zpt , η∗,jt ; .), I∗} solves the individual’s problem for East
Germans of types p ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {h, l} who are not involuntarily
unemployed;
3. for those individuals in East Germany who are involuntarily unemployed
optimal decisions about personal consumption and bequests coincide
with those of voluntarily unemployed individuals;
4. the rate of involuntary unemployment coincides with East Germans’s
expectations, equation 2.3.16 holds;
5. markets for goods and capital and the West German labor market clear;
6. the East German labor market is in positive net supply or inactive;
7. (τut ) is such that the unemployment insurance is self-financing, equa-
tion 2.3.11 holds;
8. the government’s budget is balanced, equation 2.3.10 holds with Gt ≥ 0.
2.3.4 Calibration
For the extended model economy, I maintain parameters values as fixed and
calibrated for the basic model (see Table 2.2.3).53 However, some additional
parameters need to be specified. I fix values for the discount on wages as well
as initial values for relative population size, and capital stock, and calibrate
values for relative TFP, the discount on the rental rate, the fraction of mo-
bile Germans, and their moving costs in order to match certain reunification
statistics.
53Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2007) find that it takes two generations for East German
preferences to convert to those of West Germans. Assuming a different value for the pref-
erence parameter ω, for East Germans does not have a direct effect on their occupational
choices.
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In 1991, wages in East Germany were set to 50% of West German wages, by
1995, they were fixed at 70% and by 2007 they had reached about 80% of West
German wages. I use the intermediate value and set λt to 0.3. The original
population of the GDR was equal to one fourth the size of the West German
population.54 In order to estimate the initial capital stock of the East German
economy, I use data on the German gross capital stock measured in prices of
2000, from the Statistisches Bundesamt (2006) and Statistisches A¨mter der
La¨nder (2009). In 1991, the per-capita capital stock of East Germany was less
than half the per capita capital stock of West Germany, i.e. X∗t = 0.43Xt. The
remaining parameters, relative TFP, the discount on the rental rate of capi-
tal in East Germany χt, the fraction of mobile individuals θ, and their moving
costs ηlt are calibrated to match the calibration targets displayed in Table 2.3.4.
Table 2.3.4: Calibration Targets for the Extended Model Economy
Data Model
East to West German Labor Productivity 68% 67%
East-West Net Migration as % of Eastern Population 7.5% 7.5%
Investment Aid to West German GDP 1% 1%
East German Unemployment 27% 27%
The ratio of East to West German labor productivity measured as GDP per
employed person rose from 35% in 1991 to 78% in 2007 (Statistisches Bunde-
samt (2006)). I take the average value over the years 1991 to 2007 and set the
calibration target for the ratio of labor productivities to 68%. I set the initial
ratio of East to West German TFP,
A∗t
At
to 0.7451 to match this target to the
model’s ratio of output over workers and managers in East and West Germany.
The discount on the rental rate of capital in East Germany χt, is calibrated
to a value of 0.201 to match a ratio of investment-aid to West German GDP
54The mass of the entire German population is normalized to one; Pt individuals live
in West Germany and P ∗t = 1 − Pt individuals live in East Germany. After reunification,
migration may alter the population size of East and West Germany.
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of 1%.55 According to Wurzel (2001) between 1991 and 1995 annual public
transfers for support to enterprises and business-near infrastructure were in
the range of 0.63% and 0.99% of West German GDP.56
The fraction of mobile individuals θ, is assigned a value of 0.5 to match
that net migration from East Germany between 1989 and 2002 amounted to
7.5% of the original population of East Germany. I calibrate moving costs for
mobile Germans ηlt, to a value equal to 42.34% of per-capita GDP of a pre-
reunification generation in the model, in order to match an unemployment rate
of 27%. While, the average official East German unemployment rate for 1991
to 2007 was 17.5% (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2008)), adding the so called
“hidden” unemployed, those who do not appear as officially unemployed due to
some form of active labor market policy (training programmes, wage subsidies,
early retirement schemes) increases the unemployment rate to around 27%
(Sachversta¨ndigenrat (2007)).57 Table 2.3.5 contains all additional parameter
values for the extended model economy.
2.3.5 Results
I simulate the extended model economy for one period (one generation). The
extended model economy hits the calibration targets of Table 2.3.4 well. Ta-
ble 2.3.6 displays additional results for one generation after reunification.
55The estimated value of χt = 0.201 is somewhat in line with Ragnitz (2002) who finds
that in 2000 most firms in East Germany still received investment aids of around one quarter
of their investment costs.
56These do not include special depreciation allowances, debt servicing expenditure and
credits.
57The Sachversta¨ndigenrat (2007) publishes numbers of registered and hidden unem-
ployed. Between 1993 and 2003, the number of hidden unemployed in East Germany was
on average equal to 55% of registered unemployed. Moving costs for East Germans η∗,jt are
assumed to be equal to moving costs for West Germans. Immobile Germans face infinitely
high moving costs, ηht =∞.
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Table 2.3.5: Additional Parameters for the Extended Model Economy
Discount on East German Wages (λt) 0.3
Initial Ratio of East to West German Population 0.25
Initial Ratio of East to West German Capital Stock 0.43
Initial Ratio of East to West German TFP 0.7451
Discount on East German Rental Rate (χt) 0.201
Fraction of Mobile Germans (θ) 0.5
Moving Costs for Mobile Germans (ηlt) 0.4234
Yt−1
Pt−1
Results show a lack of entrepreneurship in East Germany as pointed out
by the OECD (2007). After reunification 6.4% of East Germans set up their
own business, but around 24% of them do so in West Germany. Of those who
stay in East Germany only 5.3% set up a business, compared to 6.9% of West
Germans before reunification. After reunification, no West German migrates
to East Germany to set up a business there. The fraction of West German
entrepreneurs decreases slightly to 6.8%, due to a higher interest rate. A lower
aggregate per capita capital stock and high capital demand by East German
firms that face lower capital costs lead to a rise in the interest rate. In addition,
the lower per capita capital stock reduces the aggregate capital-output ratio.
The inflow of talented East German entrepreneurs raises the fraction of
entrepreneurs in the new West German population to 7.1%. Relative accu-
mulative talent of entrepreneurs in West Germany increases and causes West
German TFP to grow at an annual rate of 1.66%, compared to 1.57% before
reunification. East German entrepreneurs are immobile or less talented in-
dividuals and relative accumulative talent of entrepreneurs in East Germany
is 13.6% lower than in West Germany. Thus, TFP in East Germany grows
at a lower rate of 1.42%. On the aggregate, TFP grows at an annual rate
of 1.61%. Increased aggregate TFP growth leads to a slight decrease in the
value of parental background. Having had a parent who was an entrepreneur
increases one’s managerial knowhow by 69.5%, (φ = 0.695).
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Table 2.3.6: Reunification: Results After One Generation
Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurs 6.7%
Entrepreneurs in East Germany 5.3%
East German Entrepreneurs 6.4%
... of those going West 23.8%
Entrepreneurs in West Germany 7.1%
West Germans Entrepreneurs 6.8%
... of those going East 0
Entrepreneurial background individuals becoming entrepreneurs 59.5%
Working background individuals becoming entrepreneurs 3.6%
Value of Entrepreneurial Parental Background 0.695
Entrepreneurs ’s relative accumulative talent 1.43
... in East (Q¯∗t /P ∗t+1) 1.27
... in West (Q¯t/Pt+1) 1.47
Germany
Annual Capital-Output Ratio 2.26
Annual Rental Rate of Capital 6.8%
Unemployment Rate 9.4%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP 1.61%
Investment Aid to Government Revenue 6.6%
Fraction of Taxes Paid in West Germany 89.5%
Contribution to Unemployment Insurance 1.65%
Fraction of Contributions paid in East Germany 10.5%
Fraction of Unemployment Benefits Paid in East Germany 52.6%
West Germany
Annual Growth Rate of TFP 1.66%
Annual Growth Rate of GDP per capita 2.25%
Unemployment Rate 5.5%
Average Firm Size 12.4
East Germany
Annual Output per Capita East to West 51.7%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP 1.41%
Unemployment Rate 27%
of those involuntarily unemployed 33.4%
Fraction of Workers going West 8.7%
Average Firm Size 13.0
Moving Costs to annual GDP per capita East 12.5%
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The fraction of individuals from an entrepreneurial parental background
who become entrepreneurs decreases slightly, from 60% to 59.5%, while the
fraction of those from a working family background increases from 3% to 3.6%.
This is due to the fact that all East German entrepreneurs have a working fam-
ily background.58 In the first generation after reunification, GDP per capita in
West Germany increases by 2.25% annually, only slightly lower than the an-
nual GDP growth rate of 2.26% for West Germany before reunification. The
model’s estimates of the per capita GDP ratio for East to West Germany of
52% is eight percentage points lower than the average ratio of 60% for 1991 to
2008 in the data (Statistisches A¨mter der La¨nder (2009)).
About one third of the East German unemployed, around 10% of the East
German population, are involuntarily unemployed. The remaining two-thirds,
17% of East Germans, decide not to work. As benefits are indexed by West
German wages the fraction of voluntarily unemployed in East Germany clearly
exceeds the one in West Germany.59 The West German unemployment rate
remains almost unchanged and aggregate unemployment increases to 9.4%.
This result of the model is very much in line with data. Average aggregate
unemployment between 1992 and 2007 was 9.8% (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit
(2007)). More unemployed individuals and unchanged unemployment benefits
require an increase in the contribution to unemployment insurance to 1.65%.
More than half of all unemployment benefits are paid out in East Germany,
while contributions by East German workers and entrepreneurs make up only
10.5%. Data by the Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit (2006) indicate a cross subsidiz-
ing of unemployment benefits between East and West Germany but to a lesser
extent. Between 1996 and 2006, on average 35.4% of unemployment benefits
were paid out in East Germany.
58According to Solga (2006), elite reproduction (i.e. outflow from nomenklatura to upper
service class positions) in East Germany was limited and education and acquired skills rather
than party membership were the dominant criteria for elite recruitment after 1989.
59This result is in line with findings by Snower and Merkl (2006) and Canova and Ravn
(2000) who assign an important role to generous welfare provisions in explaining low output
and employment in East Germany.
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Income of the unemployed in East Germany is thus subsidized by West Ger-
man contributions and workers and entrepreneurs in West Germany contribute
89.5% to government revenues of which 6.6% are used for investment aids for
entrepreneurs in East Germany. Entrepreneurs in East Germany hire on av-
erage 0.6 workers more than entrepreneurs in West Germany. This results of
the model is consistent with data showing that the small and medium sized
sector is relatively more important in West than in East Germany.60 Around
9% of East German workers migrate to West Germany. Their moving costs
and those of East Germans entrepreneurs are equal to around 12.5% of annual
East German GDP per capita.
Micro-Data Ideally one would want to compare the model’s results to micro-
data on the interaction of occupational choice and migration. Table 2.3.7 dis-
plays statistics on East-West migration and self-employment taken from the
unbalanced German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) for 1992 to 2006. However,
given the very small sample size – for instance there are only 32 observations
over 14 years on East German self-employed who migrate permanently to West
Germany – these statistics can only be viewed as suggestive.
Table 2.3.7: SOEP Unbalanced Panel Data for Labor Force Participants, age
18-65, 1992-2006 (number of observations)
West Sample A East Sample C
Self-employed 8.8% (765) 7.0% (395)
Permanent migrants
to East and West respectively 1.1% (92) 10.5% (597)
Permanent migrants
among Self employed 1.0% (8) 8.1% (32)
Differences in self-employment rates between East and West Germany are
60 Data from the Statistisches Bundesamt (2008) shows that in 2004 there were 39 and
33.8 firms with 0-9 employees, 2.9 and 2.7 firms with 10-49 and 0.7 and 0.7 firms with 50
and more employees in West and East Germany respectively (per 1000 inhabitants).
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of a similar magnitude as estimated by the model.61 While in the model the
fraction of entrepreneurs in East Germany is 25% lower than the fraction of
entrepreneurs in West Germany, data in Table 2.3.7 indicates a difference of
20% in the fractions of self-employed in East and West Germany. Migration
from East to West Germany is slightly higher in this data set than in the data
used for calibration. Migration from West to East is very limited and despite
the larger West German population for every four self-employed migrating from
East to West, there is one West German self-employed setting up his business
in East Germany. Compared to the model’s results, fewer East German self-
employed seem to migrate to West Germany.
Future Outlook “For value added in East Germany to reach 90 per cent
of that of West Germany by 2020, the East German economy would have to
grow by an above-average 4-5 per cent a year.”(Gespra¨chskreis Ost (2004), own
translation). Stakes for East Germany to reach West German levels of output
are high. In order to be able to provide some future outlook for East Ger-
many given the current reunification scenario, I simulate the extended model
economy for five additional generations. I assume that over time moving costs
decrease and spill-over effects cause TFP levels in East and West Germany to
converge. While simulating the model economy for more periods can provide
some future perspectives, these cannot be contrasted with data. However, de-
mographic forecasts for East Germany turn out to coincide with some of the
model’s predictions.62
While the situation for West Germany will change little – rates of unemploy-
ment, fraction of entrepreneurs, and GDP growth remain stable – the situation
in East Germany will be characterized by empty regions with very few active
individuals. Given a high probability of involuntary unemployment East Ger-
61Difference in levels between model and data are most likely due to the fact that the
fraction of entrepreneurs in the model refers to self-employed with employees while the data
set includes also own-account workers.
62See Appendix A.2.7 for details on results.
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man workers will continue to migrate to West Germany. Low talent individuals
and immobile individuals will stay behind. In the following generation these
individuals will be replaced by a child of random talent who will be immobile
or mobile with a probability of 50%. And of these children only the least able
and the immobile will stay in East Germany. This process will repeat itself the
following generation. The East German population will thus be continuously
shrinking.63 If innate talent of parents and children were positively correlat-
ed in this model, over time the East German population would be reduced
to least able individuals only. While the model’s scenario is obviously an ex-
treme case, numerous newspaper articles, as “Geschichten vom Verschwinden”
(Tagesspiegel 27.05.2006) or “Waiting for the East to flourish”, (BBC News,
09/09/2005) or “Wieder der doofe Rest” (Spiegel, 3/2002), or “Tearing itself
down; Depopulation of eastern Germany” (The Economist, 12/04/2008) have
been discussing the situation of deserted regions in East Germany.64
2.4 Counterfactual Experiments
Given prospects of a deserted East Germany, the question arises: How could
East Germany’s growth experience been different? Especially the wage-setting
policy seems to oppress incentives to become an entrepreneur. In addition so-
cial rigidities in West Germany that assign an important role to parental back-
ground make it difficult for East German individuals who want to set up their
own business to compete with West Germans in terms of managerial knowhow.
And free migration implies an attractive outside option for East Germans to
work or set up a business in West Germany. In this section I perform three
counterfactual experiments that assume for the first period after reunification,
1)East Germany having flexible wages, 2)East Germany integrating into a so-
63If the long run allocation will be a completely depopulated East Germany depends on
the speed of convergence of TFPs versus the decline in moving costs.
64A study of the Berlin Institut (2007) shows that high rates of migration in some regions
of East Germany can be linked to local issues of increasing crime and radical political
movements.
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cially mobile West Germany, and 3)migration restriction for East and West
Germans. Results of all experiments are presented face to face with results
for one period after reunification (Benchmark results). For results of all coun-
terfactual scenarios to be comparable to the Benchmark scenario I adjust the
discount on the rental rate of capital, χt, in order to keep the amount of in-
vestment aid paid at the Benchmark level.
2.4.1 Flexible Wages
In this counterfactual experiment I allow for wages to freely adjust in each of
the locally separated labor markets. I assume that moving costs, and unem-
ployment benefits paid are maintained as specified in Tables 2.2.3 and 2.3.5.65
I lower the discount on the rental rate of capital to χt = 0.1799, such that
investment aids paid to East German firms are as in the Benchmark case. Ta-
ble 2.4.8 displays results of this counterfactual experiment.
If wages in East Germany are to adjust freely, they fall. Gross wages per
efficiency units are 2% lower than in the Benchmark scenario. This fall is large
enough to reduce unemployment by nine percentage points to 18%. All unem-
ployment is voluntary. The fact that the share of voluntarily unemployed is
more than three times the one in West Germany is due to welfare provisions
being linked to West German wages. Lower East German wages translate into
higher profits for entrepreneurs, and a larger fraction of East Germans set up
a business in East Germany, 5.6% compared to 5.3%. Less unemployment and
more entrepreneurs imply higher output. Per capita output in East Germany
is 12% higher while per capita output in West Germany drops slightly. Thus,
65Note that the guess on involuntary unemployment in East Germany in this case is zero
and Equation 2.3.3 reduces to (1 − τut − τ)w∗t q. In order to avoid introducing a motive
for unemployed to migrate as well, unemployment benefits in both parts of Germany are
specified as fractions of West German wages.
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Table 2.4.8: Flexible Wages
Flexible Wages Benchmark
Wage per efficiency unit East 98.0 100
Entrepreneurs in East Germany 5.6% 5.3%
East German Entrepreneurs 6.4% 6.4%
... of those going West 17.1% 23.8%
Unemployed East 18.1% 27%
of those involuntarily unemployed 0 33.4%
Net Wage per efficiency unit West 100.4 100
Annual Output per Capita East to West 58.5% 51.7%
Annual Output per capita East 112.4 100
Annual Output per capita West 99.2 100
Total Annual Output per capita 100.4 100
Annual Growth Rate of TFP East 1.55% 1.41%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP West 1.63% 1.66%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP Total 1.61% 1.61%
Average profits Entrepreneur in East 105.0 100
Average profits Entrepreneur in West 100.8 100
Average profits Entrepreneur West German 100.4 100
Average profits Entrepreneur East German in West 113.5 100
Net migration to Population East 5.1% 7.5%
Fraction of Workers going West 5.2% 8.7%
the ratio of GDP per capita East-to West increases to 58.5%. Lower labor costs
in East Germany make it relatively less profitable to set up a business in West
Germany over setting it up in East Germany and fewer entrepreneurs migrate,
17% compared to 23% in the benchmark scenario. More and more talented
entrepreneurs in East Germany cause East German TFP to grow at an annual
rate of 1.55%. In West Germany on the other hand, there are fewer talented
entrepreneurs from East Germany which leads to a reduction in output per
capita and TFP growth under the flexible wage scenario. West German work-
ers are better off because due to the reduced contribution to unemployment
insurance their net wages increase slightly.
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Increased migration of workers that was supposedly feared by labor unions
who pressed for equal wages in East and West Germany does not happen.
While workers’ wages are lower, their expected wages increase as the threat of
involuntary unemployment is eliminated. Hence, less workers migrate to West
Germany, 5.2% compared to 8.7% under the Benchmark scenario. Overall mi-
gration is reduced by almost one third and of all East Germans, 5.1% leave.
In terms of welfare, East German workers are worse off while all entrepreneurs
and West German workers gain. On average the East German individual is
better off. This positive effect for East Germany dominates and while overall
TFP growth remains unchanged, output per capita is slightly higher under the
flexible wage scenario. Given that consumption is a fixed fraction of output in
this model, flexible wages are welfare improving for all of Germany.
2.4.2 Integration into Socially Mobile West Germany
If East Germany had integrated into a social mobile economy, where an indi-
vidual’s managerial knowhow was solely defined by his innate talent, the initial
disadvantage of missing generations of entrepreneurs in East Germany would
have become obsolete. For this counterfactual experiment I maintain the wage
discounts for East Germany but set the value of parental background in en-
trepreneurship to zero and I lower the discount on the rental rate of capital to
χt = 0.1836, such that investment aids paid to East German firms are as in
the Benchmark case. Average managerial knowhow is the same for East and
West Germans. But in order for the average German managerial knowhow in
this scenario to be equal to the one in the reunification scenario the parameter
for the mean log talent µ is raised to 2.148. Table 2.4.9 displays the model’s
results for the integration of East Germany into a socially mobile economy.
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Table 2.4.9: Integration into Socially Mobile Economy
Integration into Benchmark
Socially Mobile
Economy
Wage per efficiency unit West 97.9 100
Entrepreneurs in East Germany 5.6% 5.3%
East German Entrepreneurs 8.4% 6.4%
... of those going West 37.3% 23.8%
Average profits Entrepreneur in East 103.3 100
Average profits Entrepreneur in West 118.1 100
Average profits Entrepreneur West German 122.0 100
Average profits Entrepreneur East German in West 86.41 100
Unemployed East 19.2% 27%
of those involuntarily unemployed 17.9% 33.4%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP East 1.53% 1.41%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP West 1.92% 1.66%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP Total 1.85% 1.61%
Annual Output per Capita East to West 57.1% 51.7%
Annual Output per capita East 110.8 100
Annual Output per capita West 100.3 100
Total Annual Output per capita 101.3 100
Net migration to Population East 6.7% 7.5%
Workers going West 4.9% 8.7%
Entrepreneurial Backgr.
Indvs. Becoming Entrepreneurs 5.26% 59.5%
Working Backgr.
Indvs. Becoming Entrepreneurs 5.92% 3.6%
If East Germany integrates into a socially mobile economy, the fraction
of East Germans who become entrepreneurs is 31% higher than under the
Benchmark scenario, 8.4% instead of 6.4% of East Germans set up their own
business. However 37.3% of them do so in West Germany. Unemployment
is reduced by eight percentage points from 27% to 19% but 3.4% of the East
German population is still involuntary unemployed. Migration is slightly low-
er due to the reduction in involuntary unemployment, 6.4% of East Germans
migrate to West Germany compared to 7.5% in the Benchmark case. How-
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ever, the composition of migrants changes. More East Germans migrate to
West Germany to set up their business and fewer East Germans migrate to
work in West Germany, 4.9% compared to 8.7%. Higher employment leads
to more output. East Germany produces 10% more output per capita and its
TFP grows at a rate 8.5% higher compared to the Benchmark case. Given,
no additional value of parental background talent is optimally allocated and
aggregate TFP growth is higher, overall output per capita is higher and wel-
fare improves with respect to the Benchmark scenario. East German output
per capita increase by more is equal to 57% of West German per capita GDP.
As parental background has no value, the fraction of entrepreneurs coming
from an entrepreneurial family background is reduced to values for individuals
coming from a working family background. The fact that the latter fraction
is slightly larger than the former, 5.9% versus 5.2% is entirely due to the fact
that all East German entrepreneurs are children of workers. For West German
individuals these fractions are identical.
2.4.3 Migration Restriction
If East Germans are not allowed to migrate their occupational choices are
those of West Germans before reunification. For this policy experiment I as-
sume that all East and West Germans are immobile, i.e. have infinitely large
moving costs.66 I maintain all parameter values as well as the wage discount
but lower the discount on the rental rate of capital to χt = 0.167, such that
investment aids paid to East German firms are as in the Benchmark case. Ta-
ble 2.4.10 displays the model’s results for the case of no migration between
East and West Germany.
66I set the fraction of mobile Germans (θ) to zero.
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Table 2.4.10: Migration Restrictions
No Migration Benchmark
Entrepreneurs in East Germany 5.4% 5.3%
Average profits Entrepreneur in East 113.5 100
Average profits Entrepreneur in West 99.4 100
Average profits Entrepreneur West German 100.2 100
Gross Wage per efficiency unit West 100 100
Contribution to Unemployment Insurance 1.5% 1.65%
Net Wage per efficiency unit West 100.2 100
Unemployed East 21.3% 27%
of those involuntarily unemployed 23.2 % 33.4%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP East 1.66% 1.41%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP West 1.60 % 1.66%
Annual Growth Rate of TFP Total 1.61% 1.61%
Annual Output per Capita East to West 61.4% 51.7%
Annual Output per capita East 116.7 100
Annual Output per capita West 98.3 100
Total Annual Output per capita 99.7 100
Average Firm Size 13.6 13.0
Without the option to migrate 5.4% of East Germans decide to set up their
own business. Those talented entrepreneurs who opt for migration under the
reunification scenario set up their businesses in East Germany given migration
restrictions. Thus, average profits in East Germany increase by 13% despite
the lower discount on the rental rate of capital. More talented entrepreneurs
hire more workers and the average firm size increase by 0.6 workers. More
employment is thus created and unemployment is reduced by about six per-
centage points. Still 23.2% of the unemployed, i.e. about 5% of the East
German population is involuntary unemployed. More and more talented en-
trepreneurs also contribute to TFP growth which is high at 1.66% annually,
an increase of 18% over TFP growth in the Benchmark case. More and bet-
ter entrepreneurs and higher employment lead to more output. Without the
option to migrate East German per capita output is 17% larger compared to
the Benchmark scenario. West Germany on the other hand, deprived of the
inflow of talented entrepreneurs from East Germany sees its output per capita
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reduced by around 2% and faces lower TFP growth. In the case of complete
restrictions on migrations the negative effects for West Germany dominate and
while overall TFP growth remains constant, output per capita is 0.3% lower
compared to the Benchmark scenario and thus welfare slightly decreases.
2.5 Conclusion
East Germany’s post-1989 experience is and has been remarkably different
from that of other transition countries. Its integration into an established and
highly regulated economy hindered a fruitful development of entrepreneuri-
al activity. While East Germany is still suffering the consequences of its
lack of entrepreneurship, as high rates of unemployment and low economic
growth, other transition countries are flourishing. When parental background
in entrepreneurship is nonexistent the most talented individuals become en-
trepreneurs. They innovate and contribute to economic growth. This optimal
allocation of talent did not happen in East Germany. Especially the West
German policy of fixing wages in East Germany at a fraction of West German
wages oppressed incentives to set up businesses.67 In addition the option to
migrate to West Germany drew in the most talented and mobile East Ger-
mans, while the importance of entrepreneurial parental background in West
Germany, implied an initial disadvantage for East Germans who lacked any
entrepreneurial tradition.
Prospects for East Germany are devastating and speak of deserted regions.
Counterfactual experiments show that East Germany’s experience could have
been better had wages been flexible in East and West Germany, had West
Germany been a socially mobile economy where parental background in en-
trepreneurship played no role, or had migration to West Germany been very
67For Southern Italy, Alesina et al. (2001) find a similar negative effect of a government
wage setting policy - high public sector wages - on entrepreneurship.
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costly. However, while flexible wages and a social mobile West Germany would
have also led to more output and higher economic growth for all of Germany,
migration restrictions would have been exclusively beneficial to East German
output and economic growth. The lack of entrepreneurship, employment, and
economic growth in East Germany would have been less severe had West Ger-
man policy makers opted for flexible wages in both parts of Germany. Contrary
to conventional wisdom, this policy would have decreased migration from East
to West Germany as the threat of involuntary unemployment had disappeared
and expected wages for those staying in East Germany would have increased.
Based on the calibration of the model, in a world of flexible wages around
416,000 fewer East Germans would have migrated to work or set up a business
in West Germany.
In essence, East Germany’s economic take-off seems to have been hindered
by West German policies and institutions.68 The model’s result for the coun-
terfactual scenarios even suggest that under the current reunification scenario,
West Germany benefited from a selective inflow of migration. One is thus left
with the question to what extent the current reunification scenario has been
self-serving for West Germans.
68 This finding is in line with that of various other authors (see e.g. Diewald et al. (2006)
or Bonin and Zimmermann (2000)).
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A.1.1 Measures of the Informal Economy
Figure A.1.1.1: Different Estimates of Informal economy in OECD countries
for 89/90
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Data: Schneider (2002) and Friedman et al. (2000)
Schneider (2002) estimates the informal economy either by the currency
demand approach that attributes any changes in ’excess’ demand in currency
to increases in informality or by the so-called DYMIMIC (dynamic multiple-
indicators multiple-causes) model that incorporates multiple causes of infor-
mality into the estimation. The basic idea of the currency demand method is to
estimate the ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts by running
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regressions. Explanatory variables are interest rate, per capita income, propor-
tion of wages and salaries, and tax rates. Schneider (2002) then compares the
demand for currency when taxes are at their lowest value to the demand for
currency at current tax rates. He attributes this difference in currency demand
to the informal economy. Two assumption are crucial: All transactions in the
informal sector are paid in cash and income velocity in the informal economy
is the same as in the formal economy. The DYMIMIC method or model ap-
proach incorporates multiple driving forces of the informal economy into its
estimation. A detailed description of this method can be found in Aigner et al.
(1988). The currency demand method and the model approach are just two
of many ways to try to measure something not measured by statistical offices
and government institutions. The transactions approach developed by Feige
(1981) is similar to the currency demand method. It estimates the income
which should have been produced by all non-financial transactions and com-
pares it to the observed income in an economy. The difference is thought to
have been generated by the informal sector. Other methods apply surveys,
discrepancies between expenditure and income, or differences between official
and actual labor force participation rate to estimate the size of the informal
economy. Friedman et al. (2000) use estimates of the informal economy ob-
tained by the so called physical input or electricity method. Schneider and
Enste (2000) provide an overview of all of these methods. There is no overall
accepted method and all are criticized for various reasons (see Thomas (1999)).
Estimates obtained by Schneider (2002) and those of Friedman et al. (2000)
differ but they are highly correlated (see Figure A.1.1.1). Schneider (2002) is
the only one who provides complete estimates for the informal economy for all
high-income OECD countries for the period 1989-2002. Davis and Henrekson
(2004) and Busato and Chiarini (2004) also use his estimates.
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A.1.2 Robustness Check
Benchmark Country To check the robustness of the results to the choice
of the Benchmark country I calibrate the model to data for Sweden. After
France, Sweden is the second most representative country. Its average firm
size, informal economy, and employment and establishment shares of firms
with less than ten employees are second closest to the mean values of these
four variables across all 21 high-income countries ( for calibration details see
Tables A.1.2.2 and A.1.2.3). When Sweden is chosen as the Benchmark country
for calibration the model’s main results are preserved (see Table A.1.2.1).A.1.1
The model with differences in tax rates alone can only account for little of
the variation in informality across high-income countries while differences in
governance quality seem to play a more important role. Overall, all model
specifications account for less variation when calibrated to Sweden but they
improve slightly in terms of the rank correlation coefficient. Mean informality is
higher than in the data. In addition, when choosing Sweden as the Benchmark
country the positive relationships between informal economy and tax rates as
well as the negative relation between informal economy and governance quality
are preserved.
Table A.1.2.1: Results for Model Calibrated to Sweden
Model with Differences in:
Taxes Only Gov. Only Taxes + Gov.
Mean Informality 0.179 0.201 0.189
Coefficient of Variation 0.32 0.42 0.53
Rank correlation coefficient
(Spearman) 0.47 0.42 0.79
A.1.1Calibration targets are from the same sources as those for the original calibration (see
Section 1.3). Note that in contrast to France fines for tax evasion in Sweden are defined as
surcharges on undeclared income rather than tax evades, hence here s = Mpi∗ . The capital-
output ratio for Sweden is taken from Floden and Linde´ (2001).
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Table A.1.2.2: Calibration Targets and Model Values for Sweden
Target Model
Average firm size 7 7
Employment share of micro firms (0-9 employees) 38.4% 38.4%%
Establishment share of micro firms (0-9 employees) 93.4% 82.5%
Capital-output ratio 2 2
Capital share 0.323 0.323
Surcharge on undeclared income 0.4 0.4
Informal economy 19.1% 19.1%
Table A.1.2.3: Parameter Values-Sweden
Depreciation rate (δ) 0.1
Span-of-Control (γ) 0.71
Mean log-managerial ability (µ) 0
Dispersion in log-managerial ability (σ) 2.202
Discount factor (β) 0.9421
Importance of capital (ν) 0.4549
Parameter for probability of getting caught (θ) 0.00492
Fine for evading taxes (M) 0.7
Measure of Governance Quality To check the robustness of results to
the choice of the measure of governance quality I simulate the model with
differences in tax rates and differences in governance quality using alternative
measures.A.1.2 The positive relationship between tax rates and informality
is preserved when alternative measures of governance quality are used. The
same holds true for the negative relationship between governance quality and
informality. Table A.1.2.4 reports statistics for the model with differences in
tax rates and differences in governance quality when alternative measures are
used. In all cases, the coefficient of variation is closer to the one in the data
suggesting that when using alternative measures the model can account for
more variation in informality across high-income countries. However, along
A.1.2Data for alternative measures of governance quality are taken from Kaufmann et al.
(2006) and Transparency International (2002).
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other dimensions a model using alternative measures of governance quality
performs worse. Mean informality is between three and 6 percentage points
lower, indicating that France is ranked lower in all other alternative governance
indicators compared to the GCI-Governance Index. In addition, results for all
alternative measures are associated to a lower rank correlation coefficient.
Table A.1.2.4: Results for Model with Differences in Tax Rates and Alternative
Measures of Governance Quality
Mean Coefficient Rank correlation
Informality of Variation coefficient
(Spearman)
Rule of Law 0.11 1.91 0.56
Regulatory Quality 0.10 1.48 0.45
Transparency International 0.11 1.51 0.46
Government Effectiveness 0.13 1.56 0.56
Control of Corruption 0.10 2.59 0.41
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A.1.3 Data Appendix
Table A.1.3.1: Data on costs of tax collection*
Ci cwi Si
costs of fraction of proportion of
revenue wage staff
collection per costs assigned to
100 unit in revenue enforcement
revenue collection costs tasks
Greece 1.65 0.861 -
Portugal 1.51 0.832 -
Spain 0.83 0.672 0.348
Italy 0.42 0.513 -
Ireland 0.91 0.73 0.4
Norway 0.59 0.59 0.36
Japan 1.67 0.786 0.827
New Zealand 0.83 0.581 0.619
US 0.57 0.729 0.3940
UK 1.04 0.594 0.158
Germany 1.8 0.853 -
Australia 1.16 0.638 0.501
France 1.41 0.808 0.43
Denmark 0.87 0.663 0.439
Sweden 0.57 0.718 0.535
Netherlands 1.39 0.647 0.401
Austria 0.91 0.844 0.708
* OECD’s Centre for Tax Policy Administration (2006).
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A.2.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Figure A.2.1.1: Sensitivity Analysis for α and φ¯−Growth Rate (g)
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Figure A.2.1.2: Sensitivity Analysis for α and φ¯ - Ratio of Likelihoods
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A.2.2 Discussion- Intergenerational Persistence
of Occupations
How many entrepreneurs come from an entrepreneurial family background?
Looking at West German data for 1970 and 1980, Arum and Mu¨ller (2004)
find that 14.7% of all self-employed had a self-employed father. Lohmann
and Luber (2004) report that between 1984 and 1988, 36% of West German
males with a self-employment family background became self-employed. On
the other end of the scale, Klein (2000) finds that only 39% of all German
family firms are in their founder generations, rising the likelihood of being an
entrepreneur if one’s parents were so to 61%. Similarly, Pistrui et al. (2000)
find that 60% of West German entrepreneurs have a parent who had been an
entrepreneur. According to Mueller (2006) German employees whose parents
have been self-employed are about 1.5 times as likely to start a business as oth-
ers.A.2.1 Geißler (2006) differentiates between social mobility of entrepreneurs
with more than 10 employees and those operating on a smaller scale. He es-
timates that 50% of the former and 19% of the latter had parents who were
also entrepreneurs. Given the broad span of estimates for the persistence of
entrepreneurship across generations, I consider alternative interpretations of
occupational inheritance. Within the framework of the model the most wealthy
individuals, who consume more and leave more bequests to their children, will
always be entrepreneurs. Hence, one can clearly distinguish three different
economic ’classes’ in the model: the unemployed, the working class, and the
entrepreneurial class. The question of ’how many entrepreneurs come from
an entrepreneurial family background?’ can thus be turned into a question of
1)class mobility and/or 2)wealth persistence and/or 3)earnings mobility.
West Germany is generally found to be a society of relatively little class mo-
bility. Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993) conclude that in West Germany “quite
A.2.1For the US Lentz and Laband (1990) find that 50% of all self-employed proprietors are
2nd generation proprietors.
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contrary to a [...] ’semi-classless’ form of society and a ’land of fluidity’ [...]
historically formed influences on class-mobility chances have largely retained
their power” (p.151) Mu¨ller and Pollak (2004) consider class mobility in West
Germany and find that for the periods 1976-80, 1982-90, and 1991-99, 64%,
63%, and 63% of large employers, and higher and lower grade professionals
with higher technical, administrative and managerial occupations remained
within their class. Furthermore, the authors conclude that “we cannot find
any major changes in (absolute) mobility experiences in the last quarter of the
twentieth century.” (pg.91) “Germany continues to have strong inheritance
effects [...] as well as particularly marked distinctions between a manual and
non-manual space of social mobility.”(pg.110) “In sum [...] in Germany a large
part of the effects of origin class on class destination is mediated through edu-
cation. In particular the hierarchical component in class-mobility results from
class inequalities in educational participation and education-based class allo-
cation.”(pg.106) This observation combined with recent data by the OECD
(2007) showing that “students from a blue-collar background are about one-
half as likely to be in higher education as compared with what their proportion
in the population would suggest.”(pg.116) indicate little class mobility in West
Germany.A.2.2
Estimates of wealth persistence by Morck et al. (2000) also sketch a pic-
ture of rather limited intergenerational mobility in West Germany, while Solon
(2002) cites estimates of intergenerational earnings elasticity that describe Ger-
many as a country of relatively high earnings mobility. However, as Goldberg-
er (1989) points out: “Naturally enough the sociologists’ models incorporate
outcomes other than income or earnings. Now suppose that intergenerational
links are stronger for occupation or socioeconomic status than for income or
earnings. Then restricting attention to the monetary measures could lead
A.2.2Comparing social mobility among European countries, Breen and Luijkx (2004) conclude
that “Germany, France, Italy, and Ireland seem to be the least fluent countries [...] [in]-
notably Germany- there is no statistically significant change[...] towards a weaker association
between origins and destinations.” (pg 73).
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an economist to understate the influence of family background on inequali-
ty.”(pg.513). Estimates on class mobility provide the most widely encompass-
ing concept of the dependence of one’s status on family background. In the
model class mobility and occupational mobility coincide and thus given that
Pistrui et al. (2000)’s and Mu¨ller and Pollak (2004)’s estimates are very similar
I am confident using the former as a target for calibration.
A.2.3 Results Basic Model
Table A.2.3.1 presents additional steady state results for the basic model rep-
resenting West Germany before reunification. On average, entrepreneurs are
twice as talented as the average individual, and entrepreneurs from a work-
ing family background are 2.4 times as talented as entrepreneurs from an
entrepreneurial family background. Having had a parent who was an en-
trepreneur increases one’s managerial knowhow by around 70%, (φ = 0.70).
Only 3% of individuals from a working family background set up their own
business, compared to 60% of individuals whose parents were entrepreneurs.
TFP grows at an annual rate of 1.57%. The annual rental rate of capital in
the model is 6.6%, somewhat higher than 5.2% – the deflated average of Ger-
man government long-term bond yields over 1970-1989, (Heston et al. (2009)
and United Nations (2010)). The model generates an average firm size of 12.7
workers per firm which is slightly higher than data suggests. Entrepreneurs
International (Compendia (2002)) indicate that between 1972 and 1989 the
average West German firm had approximately 11 employees. The ratio of un-
employment benefits to mean nominal wage in the model is 28.3% and thus
comes very close to the ratio of monthly social subsidies to the monthly nomi-
nal average equivalent income of 0.29 for West Germany for 1991(Bundesmin-
isterium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales (2008) and DIW (1995)).A.2.3 Contributions
A.2.3According to a letter from the Bundesministerium fu¨r Arbeit und Soziales, equivalent
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Table A.2.3.1: Additional Steady State Average Results: Annual Values
Entrepreneurship
Working Background Individuals Becoming Entrepreneurs 3.0%
Entrepreneurs Accumulative Talent (Q¯t) 1.4
Relative Average Intelligence of Entrepreneurs 2.2
Av. Talent of Entrepreneurs
from Working vs. Entrepreneurial Background 2.4
Value of Entrepreneurial Parental Background 0.7
West Germany before Reunification
Growth Rate of TFP 1.57%
Annual Rental Rate of Capital 6.6%
Average Firm Size (Workers) 12.7
Contribution to Unemployment Insurance 0.87%
Unemployment Benefit as Fraction of Mean Nominal Wage 28.3%
to unemployment insurance with employers and employees each paying 0.87%
of gross wages result somewhat lower in the model than in the data. According
to Glismann and Schrader (2002) contributions to unemployment insurance by
each employer and employee in West Germany between 1970 and 1989 were
equal to 1.45% of gross income.
A.2.4 Additional Comparisons for Optimal Oc-
cupational Choices
Some of the comparisons individuals make in order to make their optimal occu-
pational choice were omitted in the main body of the chapter in order to keep
the discussion tractable. However, individuals have to compare among each
occupation and rank them in order to make the right choice. Here I present
additional comparisons as well as the resulting consequences for equilibrium
data for the time period 1970 to 1989 is not available.
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equations.
West Germans West Germans also compare their wage income to prof-
its from setting up a business in East Germany. Whenever pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .) ≥
(1− τut − τ)wtq, they decide to set up a business in East Germany instead of
working in West Germany. However, the threshold resulting from this choice
is only relevant whenever z˜jt ≥ 0, and z˜jt ≤ zˆpt , i.e. whenever the marginal
entrepreneur who sets up his business in East Germany exists and has less
knowhow than the marginal entrepreneur in West Germany. In this case in all
equilibrium equations one would have to substitute the new threshold for zˆpt
and z¯pt for z˜
j
t .
Individuals in West Germany also compare unemployment benefits to prof-
its from setting up a business in East Germany. Whenever pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .) ≥ vt,
they decide to set up a business in East Germany instead of being unemployed.
Only if z˜jt ≥ 0 and z˜jt ≤ zˆpt and z˜jt < q?t does this choice become relevant, i.e.
whenever the marginal entrepreneur who sets up his business in East Germany
exists and has less knowhow than the marginal entrepreneur in West Germany
and also less knowhow than the marginal worker.
East Germans East German individuals also compare working in East Ger-
many to setting up a business in East Germany. Whenever pit(z
p
t , A
∗
t ; .) ≥
(1− ψt)(1− τut − τ)(1− λt)wtq + ψtvt they set up their own business in East
Germany. However, this choice is only relevant whenever the resulting thresh-
old is smaller than the one resulting from the choice between working in East
or West Germany (q˜jt ). In this case the marginal worker who goes to West
Germany is more talented than the marginal entrepreneur in East Germany.
Then only if the profit function for entrepreneurs in East Germany and the
function for wage income in West Germany cross twice will there be any East
German working in West Germany. In all equilibrium equations one would
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have to substitute the new threshold for zˆ∗,p,jt and possibly q˜ for the second
crossing of the profit function for entrepreneurs in East Germany and the func-
tion for wage income in West Germany.
East Germans compare incomes from working in West Germany to profits
from setting up a business in West Germany. Whenever pit(z
p
t , At, η
∗,j
t ; .) ≥
(1 − τut − τ)wtq − η∗,jt , they decide to set up a business in West Germany in-
stead of working there. This occupational choice is only relevant whenever the
marginal entrepreneur who sets up his business in West Germany exists and
has less knowhow than the marginal entrepreneur in East Germany. Then,
depending on the curvature of the profit function there might be no East Ger-
man who wants to set up his business in East Germany. It could also be the
case that those with less talent than the marginal worker who migrates to
West Germany set up their businesses in East Germany. If East Germans find
it profitable to go to West Germany to set up a business there, discounts on
wages and rental rate are not large enough to offset the lower TFP in East
Germany. Hence, neither will West Germans set up a business in East Ger-
many.
Individuals in East Germany also compare working in East Germany to set-
ting up a business in West Germany. Whenever pit(z
p
t , At, η
∗,j
t ; .) ≥ (1−ψt)(1−
τut − τ)(1 − λt)wtq + ψtvt, they decide to set up a business in West Germany
instead of working in East Germany. Again this choice is only relevant if the
marginal entrepreneur who sets up his business in West Germany exists and
has less knowhow and talent than the marginal entrepreneur in East Germany
and the marginal worker who migrates to West Germany.
Thresholds resulting from comparing unemployment benefits to wages paid
in West Germany, or possible profits earned in East or West Germany, are
never relevant. Situations in which they could matter are ruled out, given
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that West Germans only migrate to East Germany to set up their businesses
there.
A.2.5 Explicit Aggregation of Components of
Equations
Denote by nt(z
p
t , At; .), kt(z
p
t , At; .), and yt(z
p
t , At; .) demands for labor and
capital services and supply of goods by an entrepreneur born in West Ger-
many who has managerial knowhow zpt and who sets up his business in West
Germany. Demands and supply of entrepreneurs born in East Germany who
set up their businesses in West Germany are nt(z
p
t , At, η
∗,j
t ; .), kt(z
p
t , At, η
∗,j
t ; .),
and yt(z
p
t , At, η
∗,j
t ; .). Demands for labor and capital and supply of goods by
entrepreneurs born in East Germany who set up their businesses in East Ger-
many are denoted by nt(z
p
t , A
∗
t ; .), kt(z
p
t , A
∗
t ; .), and yt(z
p
t , A
∗
t ; .), whereas en-
trepreneurs born in West Germany who set up their businesses in East Ger-
many demand nt(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .) and kt(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .) and supply yt(z
p
t , A
∗
t , η
j
t ; .).
The population of West Germany is denoted by Pt. P
∗
t denotes the East Ger-
man population. Note that these aggregations are for equilibria as depict in
Figure 2.3.4, with mobile East Germans moving to West Germany to work or
set up a business and no West German moving to East Germany.
Intelligence of Entrepreneurs in East Germany
Q¯∗t = θL
∗,0
t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,0t
qf(q)dq + θL∗,1t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,1t
qf(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,0t
∫ z¯0
zˆ∗,0t
qf(q)dq + (1− θ)L∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ∗,1t
qf(q)dq.
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Intelligence of Entrepreneurs in West Germany
Q¯t = L
0
t
∫ z¯lt
zˆ0t
qf(q)dq + L1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
qf(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ z¯0
z˜∗,lt
qf(q)dq + θL∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
z˜∗,lt
qf(q)dq.
Labor demand in West Germany after reunification:
Ndt = L
0
t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ0t
nt(z
0
t , At; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
nt(z
1
t , At; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ z¯0
z˜∗,lt
nt(z
0
t , At, η
∗,l
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
z˜∗,lt
nt(z
1
t , At, η
∗,l
t ; .)f(q)dq.
Labor supply in West Germany after reunification:
N st = L
0
t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
qf(q)dq + L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
qf(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ zˆ∗,0,lt
q˜lt
qf(q)dq + θL∗,1t
∫ zˆ∗,1,lt
q˜lt
qf(q)dq.
Labor demand in East Germany after reunification:
Nd,∗t = θL
∗,0
t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,0,lt
nt(z
0
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,0t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ∗,0,ht
nt(z
0
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,1,lt
nt(z
1
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ∗,1,ht
nt(z
1
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq.
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Labor supply in East Germany after reunification:
N s,∗t = θP
∗
t
∫ q˜ht
qˆ∗t
qf(q)dq + (1− θ)P ∗t
∫ q˜lt
qˆ∗t
qf(q)dq.
Capital demand after reunification:
Kt = L
0
t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ0t
kt(z
0
t , At; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
kt(z
1
t , At; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,0,lt
kt(z
0
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq + θL
∗,1
t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,1,lt
kt(z
0
t , A
∗t; .)f(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,0t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ∗,0,ht
kt(z
0
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ∗,1,ht
kt(z
0
t , A
∗t; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ z¯0
z˜∗,lt
kt(z
0
t , At, η
∗,l
t ; .)f(q)dq + θL
∗,1
t
∫ z¯1t
z˜∗,lt
kt(z
1
t , At, η
∗,l
t ; .)f(q)dq.
Aggregate moving costs:
Ξt = η
∗,l
t θ[L
∗,0
t (
∫ zˆ∗,0,lt
q˜ht
f(q)dq +
∫ z¯0
z˜∗,lt
f(q)dq) + L∗,1t (
∫ zˆ∗,1,lt
q˜lt
f(q)dq +
∫ z¯1t
z˜∗,lt
f(q)dq)].
Law of motion for the mass of entrepreneurs in West Germany:
L1t+1 = L
0
t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ0t
f(q)dq + L1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ z¯0
z˜∗,lt
f(q)dq + θL∗,1t
∫ z¯1
z˜∗,lt
f(q)dq.
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Law of motion for the mass of entrepreneurs in East Germany:
L∗,1t+1 = θL
∗,0
t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,0,lt
f(q)dq + (1− θ)L∗,0t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ∗,0t
f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,1,lt
f(q)dq + (1− θ)L∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ∗,1,t
f(q)dq.
Goods supply after reunification:
Y s,∗t + Y
s
t = L
0
t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ0t
yt(z
0
t , At; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ1t
yt(z
1
t , At; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,0,lt
yt(z
0
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,1,lt
yt(z
1
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,0t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ∗,0,ht
yt(z
0
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ∗,1,ht
yt(z
1
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ z¯0
z˜∗,lt
yt(z
0
t , At, η
∗,l
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
z˜∗,lt
yt(z
1
t , At, η
∗,l
t ; .)f(q)dq.
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Right hand side of government budget constraint after reunification:
τΠt + (τ − ττut )Wt = τ{L1t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ1,lt
pit(z
1
t , At; .)f(q)dq +
+ L0t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ0,lt
pit(z
0
t , At; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,1,lt
pit(z
1
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ z˜∗,l
zˆ∗,0,lt
pit(z
0
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq
+ (1− θ)L∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ∗,1,ht
pit(z
1
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,0t
∫ z¯0
zˆ∗,0,ht
pit(z
0
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ z¯0
z˜∗,lt
pit(z
0
t , At, η
∗,l
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
z˜∗,l
pit(z
1
t , At, η
∗,l
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ (τ − ττut )wt{L1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆt
qf(q)dq +
+ L0t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆt
qf(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ zˆ∗,1,lt
q˜lt
qf(q)dq + θL∗,0t
∫ zˆ∗,0,lt
q˜lt
qf(q)dq +
+ (τ − ττut )(1− λt)wt
Nd∗t
N s∗t
{θL∗,1t
∫ q˜lt
qˆ∗t
qf(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,1t
∫ zˆ1t
qˆ∗t
qf(q)dq + θL∗,0t
∫ q˜lt
qˆ∗t
qf(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,0t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆ∗t
qf(q)dq}.
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Left hand side of unemployment insurance after reunification:
UBt = vt{Pt
∫ qˆt
0
f(q)dq + P ∗t
∫ qˆ∗t
0
f(q)dq +
+ (1− N
d,∗
t
N s,∗t
)[θL∗,0t
∫ q˜ht
qˆ∗t
f(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,0t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆ∗t
f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ q˜ht
qˆ∗t
f(q)dq + (1− θ)L∗,1t
∫ zˆ0t
qˆ∗t
f(q)dq]}.
Right hand side of unemployment insurance after reunification:
2τut Wt = 2τuwt{L0t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ0t
nt(z
0
t , At; .)f(q)dq + L
1
t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ1t
nt(z
1
t , At; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,0t
∫ z¯0
z˜∗,lt
nt(z
0
t , At, η
∗,l
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
z˜∗,lt
nt(z
1
t , At, η
∗,l
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ (1− λt){θL∗,0t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,0,lt
nt(z
0
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,0t
∫ z¯0t
zˆ∗,0,ht
nt(z
0
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ θL∗,1t
∫ z˜∗,lt
zˆ∗,1,lt
nt(z
1
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq +
+ (1− θ)L∗,1t
∫ z¯1t
zˆ∗,1,ht
nt(z
1
t , A
∗
t ; .)f(q)dq}}.
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A.2.6 Proof of Lemma 2.3.1
The threshold of managerial knowhow that determines who is indifferent be-
tween setting up a business in East or West Germany only exists for West
German individuals if
(1 − λt)(1−ν)γ(1 − χt)νγ < A
∗
t
At
1−γ
and for East Germans this threshold only
exists if
(1−λt)(1−ν)γ(1−χt)νγ > A
∗
t
At
1−γ
. These conditions are mutually exclusive.
A.2.7 Results Reunification after 5 periods
It seems reasonable to assume that after one generation spill-over effects and
common policies stimulating technology diffusion within Germany cause at
least a partial convergence of TFP across the two Germanies. In order to
account for this I assume that East German TFP evolves according to the
following process
A∗t = max(A
∗
t−1(1 + g
∗
t ),
1
1 + e−ρ−t
At). (A.2.71)
where in case of a lower growth rate of TFP in East Germany (g∗t ) than in
West Germany an exogenous process leads to a final convergence of TFP levels.
The parameter ρ is set to a value of 1.105 such as to match the initial ratio of
TFP for t = 1. Simulating the model economy for five generations I eliminate
the discount on wages and assume that the discount on wages is reduced as
TFP grows. As East and West Germans become more alike, I assume that
moving costs relative to GDP decrease over time, maintaining the absolute
value of moving cost for mobile Germans ηlt, constant. Table A.2.7.1 shows
the evolution of relative moving costs, discount on the rental rate of capital,
λt, and ratio of TFP for the four periods. Table ?? displays the model’s results
for the fifth generation after reunification. Four generations after reunification,
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Table A.2.7.1: Evolution of Discount on Wages, Moving Costs, TFP Ratio
Period Discount Moving Costs Ratio
after on Wage as fractions of East-to-West
Re- West German GDP German
unification per Capita of Previous Period TFP
λt η
l
t
Y wt−1
Pt−1
A∗t
At
1 0.3 0.4234 0.7451
2 0.2283 0.3331 0.7512
3 0.1086 0.1910 0.8914
4 0.0429 0.1172 0.9571
5 0.0162 0.0714 0.9838
almost 75% of the original population of East Germany has left. While 6.8% of
the East German population sets up their own business, 35.7% of them do so in
West Germany; i.e. only 5.9% of East Germans set up their business in East
Germany. This is qualitatively consistent with estimations by Ragnitz and
Schneider (2007) who predict numbers of newly self-employed in East Germany
to decrease with respect to 2002 by about 15% in 2010 and by almost 30%
in 2020. And few entrepreneurs imply low employment. 21.4% of the East
German labor force is unemployed and 13.7% of all unemployment in East
Germany is involuntary.
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Table A.2.7.2: Reunification: Results After Five Generation
Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurs in East Germany 5.9%
East Germans Becoming Entrepreneurs 6.8%
... of those going West 35.7%
Entrepreneurs in West Germany 7.0%
West Germans Becoming Entrepreneurs %
... of those going East 0
West Germany
Annual Growth Rate of TFP 1.61%
Annual Growth Rate of GDP 2.44%
Unemployment Rate 5.4%
East Germany
Annual Growth Rate of TFP 1.28%
Annual Growth Rate of GDP 1.57%
Accumulated Net migration to Population East 74.5%
Unemployment Rate 21.4%
of those involuntarily unemployed 13.7%
Workers going West 29.6%
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